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1. INTRODUCTION
Collateral—primarily financial assets such as securities—is cen-
tral to the operation of the financial markets.  Such collateral se-
cures a great variety of obligations.  In the introduction to her path-
breaking 2011 book, written in the wake of the recent financial cri-
sis, Annelise Riles put it this way: 
“Everywhere one turns today industry experts, government 
officials, and members of the media are decrying the weak 
legal, analytical, and ethical foundations of the global swap 
markets.  But if swaps are seen as economically irrational, 
financially dangerous, and prone to ethical abuse, another 
dimension of the same market has emerged as solid, re-
spected, and even morally and ethically empowered, what 
George Soros recently referred to as ‘motherhood and apple 
pie’ . . . That element is collateral.  Collateral seems to have 
survived the tectonic shifts in market ideologies of the last 
few years with its reputation intact when so much else of 
what once was unquestionable dogma—free markets, self-
regulation, the innate brilliance and rationality of deriva-
tives traders—now seems like a quaint mythology from a 
strange other world.”1 
She continued as follows: 
“[C]ollateral, as a private technology of regulation, has 
emerged as a quiet nexus of tremendous political and eco-
nomic legitimacy—within the market, the government, and 
the wider political sphere—at a moment at which both 
markets and their regulation are facing a dramatic legitima-
cy deficit internally and externally.”2 
 This paper deals with a particular type of collateral in a par-
ticular setting—securities credited to securities accounts governed 
by Japanese law.  It considers and proposes some significant, but 
1 ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE 1 (2011). 
2Id. at 4. 
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quite plausible, modifications of Japan’s Act on Transfer of Bonds, 
Shares, etc. (Book-Entry Transfer Act, or BETA).3  The proposed 
revisions are inspired by and patterned on similar provisions in 
Articles 8 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which 
have been enacted in substantially uniform fashion in every state 
of the United States.  In this respect the proposed revisions are in 
good company.  The Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions4 
and the Draft Model Law on Secured Transactions,5 each a work 
product of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), and the Cape Town Convention6 and the Ge-
neva Securities Convention (GSC),7 each a product of International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), also were 
substantially influenced by analogous provisions in the UCC. 
The BETA became fully operative for all publicly traded securi-
ties in 2009.8  Enactment of the BETA was an important step in the 
3The Act on Transfer of Bonds, Shares, etc., Act No. 75 of 2001, as amended in 
2002 (Act 65 of 2002), 2004 (Act 88 of 2004), and 2014 (Act No. 91 of 2014) [herein-
after BETA]. 
4 U.N. NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12 (2010), at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-
Guide_09-04-10English.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU47-8RMT] [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions]; see also UNCITRAL, 
GUIDE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECURITY RIGHTS REGISTRY, U.N. Sales No. 
E.14.V.6 (2014), at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/Security
-Rights-Registry-Guide-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y89N-S2QH].
5  See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Model Law on Secured Transactions, Rep. on 
the Work of Its Twenty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/865, at https://
documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V15/052/64/PDF/V1505264.
pdf?OpenElement [https://perma.cc/4MLU-7D34] [hereinafter UNCITRAL Draft 
Model Law on Secured Transactions]. 
6  Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Priv. L. [UNIDROIT], Convention on Interna-
tional Interests in Mobile Equipment, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285 (Nov. 16, 2001), at http://
www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/cape-town-convention 
[https://perma.cc/5SGP-FN7Q]; see also UNIDROIT, Protocol to the Convention 
on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (Nov. 16, 2001), at http://
www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/aircraft-protocol [https://
perma.cc/2FFA-K76H]. 
7 UNIDROIT, Convention On Substantive Rules For Intermediated Securities 
(Oct. 9, 2009), at http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/geneva-
convention [https://perma.cc/9CNZ-EC9A] [hereinafter Geneva Securities Con-
vention or GSC]; see also UNIDROIT, Final Act of the Final Session of the Diplomatic 
Conference to Adopt a Convention on Substantive Rules Regarding Intermediated Securi-
ties, CONF 11/2 – Doc 41, http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/
2009intermediatedsecurities/conference/conferencedocuments2009/conf11-2-
041-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/94VM-Z652].
8  In that year the BETA became fully operational for equity securities.  Cabi-
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modernization of the Japanese financial markets.  The Act institut-
ed a modern book-entry system for the holding and transfer (in-
cluding pledges) of interests in dematerialized securities.9  It also 
provided core reforms of the “back office” systems of the Japan Se-
curities Depository Center, Inc. (JASDEC), Japan’s central securities 
depository (CSD) for securities other than Japanese Government 
Bonds (JGBs), and Japan Securities Clearing Corporation (JSCC), 
which functions as a central counter-party, or CCP.10 
In a book chapter published in 2010, Professor Hideki Kanda 
and one of us (Mooney) suggested consideration of some possible 
adjustments to the BETA and related Japanese law.11  That chapter 
focused primarily on the operation of the Geneva Securities Con-
vention, as viewed from the perspectives of United States and Jap-
anese law.12  (In this paper we generally use the terminology used 
and defined in the GSC:  “Securities”13 are credited to a “securities 
account”14 (thereby constituting “intermediated securities”15) main-
                                                                                                                             
net Ordinance No. 350 of 2008.  When originally enacted in 2001, the BETA ap-
plied only to short term corporate debt (i.e., commercial paper).  It was extended 
to all debt securities in 2002 and to equity securities in 2004.  See supra text accom-
panying note 3. 
9 For an overview of the operation and functions of the BETA, see Charles W. 
Mooney, Jr. & Hideki Kanda, Core Issues Under the UNIDROIT (Geneva) Convention 
on Intermediated Securities:  Views From the United States and Japan, in 
INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES:  LEGAL PROBLEMS AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 81–82, 86, 93–
94, 103–04, 113–14 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2010) [hereinafter 
Mooney & Kanda, Core Issues]. 
10  For a brief overview of the operations of JASDEC and JSCC in the clear-
ance and settlement process, see id. at 61–66, 114 and accompanying text. 
11  Id. at 118–19. 
12  Id. (passim).  Mooney served as a member of the United States delegation 
and Kanda served as a member of the Japanese delegation at the four meetings of 
the Committee of Governmental Experts and at the 2008 first session and the 2009 
final session of the diplomatic conference.  Kanda also served as the chair and 
Mooney also served as a member of the drafting committee at each of the experts’ 
meetings and at both sessions of the diplomatic conference. 
13  The GSC defines “securities” broadly to mean “any shares, bonds or other 
financial instruments or financial assets (other than cash) which are capable of be-
ing credited to a securities account and of being acquired and disposed of in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Convention.”  GSC art. 1(a). 
14  A “securities account” is “an account maintained by an intermediary to 
which securities may be credited or debited.”  GSC art. 1(c). 
15  See GSC art. 1(b) (defining “intermediated securities” as “securities credit-
ed to a securities account or rights or interests in securities resulting from the 
credit of securities to a securities account”).  Except for specific references to the 
term in the context of the GSC, we use this term throughout the paper to refer 
generally to securities held through an intermediary. 
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tained with an “intermediary”16 in the name of an “account hold-
er”17). 
One suggestion was to adopt the control agreement method of 
making a transfer of an interest in intermediated securities effec-
tive against third parties (e.g. in UCC Article 9 terminology, a “per-
fected” “security interest”18) as an alternative to effecting a pledge 
or other transfer by book entries.19  (We refer here to this method as 
the CA approach.)  This method of creating an effective interest is a 
practical approach that fits well with the Japanese book-entry sys-
tem, although additional conceptual analysis and exploration of its 
compatibility with current Japanese secured transactions is need-
16 “Intermediary” is defined as “a person (including a central securities depos-
itary) that in the course of a business or other regular activity maintains securities 
accounts for others or both for others and for its own account and is acting in that 
capacity.”  GSC art. 1(d).  An English translation of the corresponding term used 
in the BETA for an intermediary other than a CSD is “account management insti-
tution” (kō za kanri kikan).  BETA art. 2(4).  This terminology is consistent with the 
principle that under the BETA the intermediary does not have a property interest 
in securities credited to accounts of its account holders as only the account holder 
at the lowest tier—the beneficial owner—is presumed to hold ownership of the 
securities.  BETA arts. 76 (corporate debt securities); 101 (JGBs); 143 (corporate eq-
uity securities).  Such an account holder is a “participant” (kanyū sha).  BETA art. 
2(3).  A CSD is a “book-entry transfer institution” (furikae kikan).  BETA art. 2(2). 
17  “Account holder” is defined as “a person in whose name an intermediary 
maintains a securities account, whether that person is acting for its own account 
or for others (including in the capacity of intermediary).”  GSC art. 1(e). 
18  The concept of “perfection” of a “security interest” is borrowed from Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-308(a) (in general, a secu-
rity interest is perfected when it has attached (i.e., has been created) under UCC § 
9-203 and the applicable perfection step or steps have been satisfied).  See U.C.C. §
1-201(b)(35) (defining “security interest”).  The UCC is a “uniform law” promul-
gated under a joint venture between the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and The American Law Institute.  Actually, it is not a
“law” at all, but simply a model promulgated with the expectation that the vari-
ous states of the United States will enact it.  Like any uniform law, it must be
adopted by a state before it becomes law.  UCC Articles 8 (investment securities)
and 9 (secured transactions) have been adopted by every state in substantially
uniform form.  “Perfection” has become a term widely used around the world to
refer to the general effectiveness of a security interest as against third parties.
19  A control agreement provides that an intermediary agrees (with the con-
sent of the account holder) that it will comply with instructions of a transferee 
without further consent of the account holder.  See generally infra Part 2.1.  A corol-
lary of control agreement effectiveness is that if the transferee is the account hold-
er’s own intermediary then a control agreement is not necessary—it would make 
little sense for the intermediary to agree to comply with its own instructions to 
itself.  Id.  Once the account holder agrees to the terms of the transfer, the transfer 
to the intermediary is effective against third parties without any further steps.  Id. 
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ed.20  As explained further below, the legal framework for book-
entry securities under the BETA relies heavily on the role of book 
entries, which are central to the system.  Under the current system 
for pledges of securities as well as jō to tanpo transfers of security 
interests (outright assignment or title transfer), book entries are re-
quired.  Consistent with the approach taken here, it has been sug-
gested that the fundamental theories and structures of book-entry 
systems should be reconsidered with a focus on the role and func-
tion of intermediaries.21 
A second suggestion by Mooney and Kanda was to provide for 
the transfer and creation of an effective interest in a securities ac-
count—i.e., in any securities that from time to time are credited to a 
securities account—again, without book entries with respect to 
specific securities subject to the transfer.  This approach would in-
corporate the concept of a “floating lien” on securities so credited, 
without the need for book entries or even specific descriptions of 
the securities.  (We refer here to this approach as the SA approach 
and to these two suggestions, together, as the CA-SA approach.)  
As suggested above, similar provisions in UCC Articles 8 and 9 
and in the GSC inspired these two suggestions.  A third suggestion 
was for Japanese law to recognize the holding of an interest in se-
curities by a beneficial owner through a nominee to whose securi-
ties account the securities are credited. 
Given the broad scope of their chapter, Mooney and Kanda did 
not pursue there a thorough examination and evaluation of these 
possible revisions of Japanese law.  This paper takes that next step 
with respect to two of the suggested revisions—the control agree-
ment method of effectiveness and the transfer of an interest in a se-
curities account.  These revisions would complement the BETA as 
currently in effect and would fit squarely within the Act’s goal of 
providing an efficient and reliable framework for the transfer of in-
20  Hiroyuki Kansaku, Denshikasareta  Yū kashō ken no Tanpoka—“Shihai” niyoru 
Tannpoka, in 22 KINYŪ HŌ MU KENKYŪ KAI HŌ KOKUSHO, YŪ KASHŌ KEN NO
PĒPĀ RESUKATŌ  NI TOMONAU TANPOKENNADO KINYŪ TORIHIKI NIKAKARU
HŌ TEKIMONDAI, 12, 21–30 (2013); Kumiko Koens, Furikaeseido niokeru Shō ken oyobi 
Shō kenkō za no Tanpoka: “Shihai” niyoru Tanpoken no Settei nitsuite [Securities and 
Securities Accounts Under the Book-Entry System: Creating an Effective Security Inter-
est by Means of a Control Agreement], 62 YAMAGATA U. J. L. & POL. 57, 78–89 (2015) 
(JAPAN).  
21 Kumiko Koens, Shō kenfurikaeseido ni okeru Kō zakanrikikan no Hō tekichii to 
tanpoken: Tō shishintaku niokeru Juekisha no Hasan no Jian wo Sozai toshite [The Legal 
Role of Securities Intermediaries in the Modern Securities Holding and Transferring Sys-
tem in Japan], 45 BULL. YAMAGATA U. (SOCIAL SCIENCE), no. 1, 2014, at 1, 8–12. 
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terests in securities credited to securities accounts.  In this connec-
tion, Part 5 contains the principal normative content of the paper; 
in many respects it is the heart of the paper.  In that part we ex-
plain that the CA-SA approach is conceptually consistent with the 
BETA and with traditional Japanese property law.  We also explore 
the policy arguments in support of adopting the CA-SA approach.  
In addition Part 5 explains that the CA-SA approach would require 
the adoption of priority rules and, to protect book-entry transfer-
ees, “cut-off” or “takes free” rules.  It also considers the CA-SA ap-
proach in light of the right of retention rules provided in the Japa-
nese Civil Code (Minpō ) and the Japanese Commercial Code 
(Shō hō ). 
We should highlight here the terminology that we employ 
throughout this paper.  We sometimes refer to a “pledge” of book-
entry securities because the accepted translation of the BETA pro-
vides for book-entry pledges and the proposals we advance here 
would supplement those provisions.  Our proposals could accom-
modate security interests (i.e., interests in book-entry securities 
that, pursuant the parties’ agreement, secure obligations of a debt-
or to a creditor), including security interests in the form of outright 
title transfers under Japanese law, i.e., jō to tanpo transfers, as well 
as outright transfers of other interests such as outright transfers of 
title in repurchase agreement (repo) transactions and transfers of 
limited (e.g., fractional) interests.  Our references to a “pledge,” 
“pledgor,” and “pledgee” in the context of book-entry securities 
contemplate only book-entry pledge transactions within the mean-
ing of and the framework of the BETA.22  Our references to a “secu-
rity interest” contemplate both such a book-entry pledge as well as 
other security interests, including jō to tanpo title transfer security 
interests.  Our references to a “transfer,” “transferor,” and “trans-
feree” contemplate any type of transfer of an interest.23  The termi-
nology used here is summarized in Figure I.1: 
22 See infra Part 4 (discussing mechanics of book-entry pledges under the 
BETA). 
23  See infra Parts 4, 5.3. (discussing the application of our proposals to out-
right transfers). 
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FIGURE I.1 
SUMMARY OF TERMINOLOGY 
Pledge = Book-entry pledges under the 
BETA 
Security interest = Pledges and other security inter-
ests, including title transfer as secu-
rity (jō to tanpo) 
Transfer = Security interests and other trans-
fers of interests, including transfers 
of limited interests 
A further note on the approach and scope of the paper is war-
ranted.  In general we favor the adoption of modern, generally ap-
plicable secured transactions laws such as UCC Article 9, the re-
gime advanced in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions,24 and the Draft Model Law on Secured Transactions 
currently being prepared by a working group of UNCITRAL.25  
Accordingly, we could support the inclusion of the CA-SA ap-
proach for security interests in book-entry securities under Japa-
nese law in a generally applicable secured transactions law that 
would incorporate such important concepts as after-acquired 
property (“floating lien”) and the securing of future obligations.26  
That said, transfers of security interests and other interests in book-
entry securities are important commercial transactions in their own 
right.  For that reason, and in order to keep the paper within a 
manageable scope and to focus in particular on the CA-SA ap-
proach, we address the issues in the context of proposed revisions 
to the BETA.  Another plausible approach would be the adoption 
of a freestanding law on non-book-entry transfers of interests in 
24 See supra note 4. 
25 See supra note 5. 
26  In this connection, we appreciate that some members of the Japanese legal 
community may have reservations about piecemeal treatment of secured transac-
tions law in separate laws that address certain types of property.  On the other 
hand, the BETA itself is an example of such special legislation.  Modifying the cur-
rent statute to provide beneficial flexibility and efficiency would not be a devia-
tion from the approach already taken for book-entry securities. 
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book-entry securities.  An example of a freestanding Japanese se-
cured transactions law is the Act on Special Provisions, Etc. of the 
Civil Code Concerning the Perfection Requirements for the As-
signment of Movables and Claims (PRAMC).27  But we do not sug-
gest that such targeted revisions necessarily reflect an optimal leg-
islative approach or that a broader approach toward secured 
transactions law would be inappropriate.28 
Revising Japanese law to provide for recognition of nominee 
holding of securities implicates much more than adjustments to the 
BETA.  An evaluation of nominee holding requires consideration 
of basic elements of Japanese property law.  These elements in-
clude the rights of creditors and purchasers and the treatment of 
the interests of a nominee and a beneficial owner in the case of a 
nominee’s insolvency proceeding.  For this reason, consideration of 
the suggestion for recognition of nominee holding must await a fu-
ture project. 
We would be remiss if we failed to add a final introductory 
comment on emerging technologies in the world of financial mar-
ket infrastructure—in particular, the block-chain (or distributed 
ledger) technology that underlies virtual currencies such as 
Bitcoin.29  An exploration of this topic is far beyond the scope of 
this paper.  Perhaps, in time, block-chain technology or its progeny 
may transmogrify the intermediated holding systems as presently 
known.  Even so, in our view, the functional perspective on the 
transfer and acquisition of interests in securities applied here 
would remain highly relevant and instructive. 
Following this Introduction, Part 2 of the paper describes the 
structure and operation of a control agreement transaction and the 
27 Dō san oyobi Saiken no Jō to no Taikō  Yō ken ni kansuru Minpō  no tokurei tō  ni 
kansuru Hō ritsu [Act on Special Provisions, etc. of the Civil Code Concerning the 
Perfection Requirements for the Assignment of Movables and Claims], Law No. 
104 of 1998 as amended and renamed by Law No. 148 of 2004 [hereinafter 
PRAMC]. 
28  Note that even if the CA-SA approach were incorporated into a generally 
applicable secured transactions law some special rules applicable only to book-
entry securities no doubt would be necessary.  Certainly this is the case with UCC 
Articles 8 and 9. 
29 See, e.g., DEPOSITORY TRUST AND CLEARING CORPORATION, EMBRACING
DISRUPTION, TAPPING THE POTENTIAL OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS TO IMPROVE THE POST-
TRADE LANDSCAPE (2016), http://www.dtcc.com/news/2016/january/25/
blockchain-white-paper;  OLIVER WYMAN & EUROCLEAR, BLOCKCHAIN IN CAPITAL 
MARKETS, THE PRIZE AND THE JOURNEY (2016), http://www.oliverwyman.com/
content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/2016/feb/BlockChain-In-Capital-
Markets.pdf [http://perma.cc/N8DP-NF2P]. 
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acquisition of an interest in a securities account.  It explains the his-
torical origins of these concepts in connection with the revisions of 
Articles 8 and 9 of the UCC and as subsequently adopted by the 
GSC.  Part 3 then provides an overview of the proposal for the CA-
SA approach under the BETA and explains the transactional roles 
of agreements that may supplement a control agreement.  Part 4 
next describes the pledge of securities under the BETA and ex-
plains how the Act could be revised to adopt the proposed control 
agreement effectiveness and the transfers of interests in securities 
accounts.  Part 4 also identifies some troublesome aspects of the 
BETA’s treatment of jō to tanpo security interests made effective by 
book entries in the context of a jō to tanpo transferee’s insolvency 
and the rights of creditors of a jō to tanpo transferee.  Part 5 next 
presents the core of the paper.  It provides a policy analysis of the 
proposed control agreement effectiveness and transfers of interests 
in securities accounts.  As indicated above, we conclude that these 
revisions would fit well with the underlying policies and the basic 
structure of the BETA, and further that on balance the revisions 
would be beneficial.  Building on the analysis in Part 5, Part 6 takes 
account of the circumstance that control agreement effectiveness 
and transfers of interests in securities accounts currently are un-
known in the Japanese financial markets.  We argue that, based on 
the United States experience, adopting the CA-SA approach for the 
BETA could provide a useful and important tool that would offer 
enhanced transactional flexibility.  We also argue that it is plausible 
that over time the Japanese markets would embrace and utilize the 
proposed revisions and, accordingly, that new transactional pat-
terns would emerge.  Part 7 then summarizes and concludes the 
paper.  
2. DRAFTING AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE CA-SA
APPROACH:  RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE AND GENEVA SECURITIES CONVENTION 
This Part describes the structure and operation of a control 
agreement transaction and the acquisition and effect of the transfer 
of an interest in a securities account.  It also provides background 
on the historical origins of these concepts in connection with the 
revisions of UCC Articles 8 and 9 and as subsequently adopted by 
the GSC.  The discussion of each topic (control agreement and then 
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securities account) considers the relevant text of UCC Article 8 
(and 9, where applicable) and the GSC.  As background, the dis-
cussion considers some of the pertinent drafting history that even-
tually led to the adoption of the relevant final texts of the UCC and 
the GSC. 
2.1.  Perfection by Control Agreement. 
2.1.1.  UCC Articles 8 and 9 
Consider first an introduction to the relevant UCC terminology 
and statutory framework as currently enacted.  When a “securi-
ty”30 or another “financial asset”31 is credited by a “securities in-
termediary”32 to a “securities account,”33 an “entitlement holder”34 
acquires a “security entitlement.”35  A security entitlement is a type 
of “investment property”36 under UCC Article 9.  A “security in-
terest”37 in investment property, including a security entitlement, 
may be perfected38 by “control.”39  Perfection of a security interest 
generally provides priority over a subsequent judicial lien credi-
tor40 and the trustee in bankruptcy41 of a “debtor.”42  Article 9 also 
contains some special priority rules for investment property.43  A 
30 U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(15) (defining “security”). 
31 U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9) (defining “financial asset”). 
32  U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14) (defining “securities intermediary”). 
33  U.C.C. § 8-501(a) (defining “securities account”). 
34 U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(7) (defining “entitlement holder”). 
35 U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17) (defining “security entitlement”). 
36 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49) ( defining “investment property”). 
37 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (defining “security interest”). 
38 See supra text accompanying note 18. 
39 U.C.C. § 9-314(a) (perfection by control).  Control of a security entitlement 
is governed by section 8-106.  U.C.C. §§ 9-106(a); 8-106.  Perfection of a security 
interest in investment property, including security entitlements, also may be 
achieved by filiing a financing statement in the proper public office.  U.C.C. §§ 9-
310(a); 9-312(a). 
40 U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2); 9-102(defining “lien creditor”). 
41  11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1). 
42  U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28) (defining “debtor”). 
43  U.C.C. § 9-328.  Conflicting security interests in security entitlements that 
are perfected by control generally rank in priority according to the time of obtain-
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“purchaser,”44 including a “secured party”45 holding a security in-
terest, obtains “control” of a security entitlement if “the securities 
intermediary has agreed that it will comply with entitlement or-
ders[46] originated by the purchaser without further consent by the 
entitlement holder.”47  However, the securities intermediary may 
so agree only with the consent of the entitlement holder.48  Such an 
agreement by a securities intermediary is generally referred to as a 
“control agreement,” although that term itself is not defined in the 
UCC.  If an entitlement holder grants an interest in its security enti-
tlement to its own securities intermediary, the intermediary has 
control; no additional step or steps are necessary.49 
When a purchaser has control of a security entitlement, the par-
ties’ agreement may afford the purchaser the exclusive right to 
originate entitlement orders to the exclusion of the entitlement 
holder.  Similarly, if the entitlement holder’s securities intermedi-
ary has control, the entitlement holder also may, by agreement, be 
precluded from originating entitlement orders.  However, if the 
parties agree that the entitlement holder will retain the right to 
originate entitlement orders (subject to any agreed upon conditions 
or exceptions) or to make substitutions for the security entitlement, 
the purchaser or securities intermediary may nevertheless continue 
to have control.50 
The current UCC statutory framework for security entitlements 
just described, including perfection of security interests in security 
entitlements by control, was largely developed during the process 
ing control, except that a security interest held by the securities intermediay has 
priority over a security interest held by another secured party.  U.C.C. § 9-
328(2)(B), (3).  If none of the special priority rules apply, then the general priority 
rules apply.  U.C.C. §§ 9-328(7); see U.C.C. §§ 9-322; 9-323.  Concerning applicable 
priority rules in connection with the CA-SA approach proposed here,  see infra 
Part 4.3. 
44 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(29) (defining “purchase”), (30) (defining “purchaser”). 
45 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73) (defining “secured party”). 
46  U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(8) (defining “entitlement order”). 
47  U.C.C. § 8-106(d)(2).  Control of a security entitlement also can be obtained 
“if . . . the purchaser becomes the entitlement holder.”  U.C.C. § 8-106(d)(1).  This 
is equivalent to a book-entry transfer of a security interest under the BETA by out-
right title transfer to a transferee’s proprietary account (or jō to tanpo); there is no 
concept of a “pledge account” under the UCC.  See infra Part 4. 
48  U.C.C. § 8-106(g).  A securities intermediary is not required to enter into a 
control agreement and is not required to confirm that it has entered into a control 
agreement unless the entitlement holder so requests.  Id. 
49 U.C.C. § 8-106(e). 
50 U.C.C. § 8-106(f). 
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for the revision of UCC Article 8 and conforming revisions to Arti-
cle 9 which began in 1991 and which was completed in 1994 (1994 
Article 8 Revisions).51  When UCC Article 9 was substantially re-
vised in 1998 (effective in all states in 2001 or 2002),52 the substan-
tive framework established in the 1994 Article 8 Revisions was re-
tained in almost all material respects.53 
In the context of security entitlements, the “control” concept 
has roots in transactional patterns that had developed even before 
the Article 8 revision process had begun.  So-called “tri-party re-
purchase (repo)” transactions provide an apt example.  In such a 
transaction a securities transferor (dealer) and a securities transfer-
ee (investor/funds transferor) have accounts with the same inter-
mediary—the dealer’s clearing bank.  On day-1 the repo securities 
are moved from the dealer’s account to the investor’s account and 
funds are moved from the investor’s account to the dealer’s ac-
count.  On day-2 (assuming a typical overnight repo) the dealer re-
purchases the securities and the transfers of securities and funds 
(with a spread—return—for the investor) are reversed.54  Under a 
control agreement arrangement the same parties are involved.  
However, the control agreement governs the relationships among 
the dealer, investor, and dealer’s clearing bank (intermediary) and 
there is no need for the investor actually to have a securities ac-
51  U.C.C. 1994 Official Text.  For background on the process and preparatory 
work and an overview of the 1994 Article 8 Revisions, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., 
Sandra M. Rocks, & Robert S. Schwartz, An Introduction to the Revised U.C.C. Arti-
cle 8 and Review of Other Recent Developments with Investment Securities, 49 Bus. 
Law. 1891 (1994).  Mooney was the American Bar Association Section of Business 
Law’s Advisor to the Drafting Committee for the Revision of U.C.C. Article 8.  He 
attended all but one of the Drafting Committee meetings during the process and 
participated in the three 1992 Drafting Committee meetings and the 1992 Annual 
Meeting mentioned below. 
52 U.C.C. 2001 Official Text, § 9-701 (uniform effective date of July 1, 2001).  
All but two states enacted the uniform effective date.  Additional revisions to 
UCC Article 9 were promulgated in in 2010 (2010 Revisions) with a uniform effec-
tive date of July 1, 2013.  U.C.C. 2010 Official Text, § 9-801.  All states now have 
adopted the 2010 Revisions.  Mooney was the Co-Reporter for the Drafting Com-
mittee to Revise Article 9 and was a member of the Joint Review Committee that 
prepared the 2010 Revisions. 
53 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-106 (control of investment property) cmt. 1 (citing as 
source “Former Section 9-115(e),” which was added by the 1994 Article 8 Revi-
sions); 9-328 (priority of security interests in investment property) cmt. 1 (citing as 
source “Former Section 9-115(5)”, which was added by the 1994 Article 8 Revi-
sions). 
54  On tri-party repos, see generally MARCIA STIGUM, AFTER THE TRADE 216–17 
(1988). 
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count with the clearing bank. 
Early on in the process leading to the 1994 Article 8 Revisions a 
consensus emerged that perfection of a security interest in securi-
ties, including those held in an account with a financial intermedi-
ary (the UCC’s predecessor term for securities intermediary), 
should be achieved if the secured party has been given the power 
to dispose of the securities.  The first public draft of UCC Article 8 
(February 1992 Draft) produced in the process was discussed at a 
meeting of the Drafting Committee, advisors, and observers held 
in Philadelphia, February 21–23, 1992.55  The February 1992 Draft 
provided that “[i]n all cases, a security interest in a security may be 
perfected by the secured party having effective power of disposi-
tion over the security.”56  Section 8-107 of that draft further provid-
ed, in part: 
(a) A person has “effective power of disposition” over secu-
rities owned by another if:
. . . . 
(4) the securities are held in an account with a financial in-
termediary in the name of the secured party (or his design-
ee other than a financial intermediary); or
(5) the securities are held for the owner in an account with a
financial intermediary, and by written agreement among
the owner, the financial intermediary, and the person, the
person has the right, without specific notice to or consent
from the owner, to instruct the financial intermediary to
transfer the securities to the person or to any other person
designated by the person.57
Thus, albeit by another name and in language less compact and 
somewhat less artful than current law, the substance of perfection 
by control had emerged. The second public draft of UCC Article 8 
was issued in 1992 (March 1992 Draft).  It further refined the con-
55  Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 8, Investment Securities, 
with Prefatory Note and Comments (February 5, 1992) [hereinafter February 1992 
Draft] (on file with authors). 
56  Id., § 8-604(a). 
57  Id., § 8-107(a)(4), (5). 
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cept of perfection by control and included conforming amend-
ments to Articles 1 and 9.58  That draft was discussed at the Draft-
ing Committee meeting held on March 27–29, 1992, in Chicago. 
The March 1992 Draft offered the first definitions of the terms “se-
curities account entitlement”59 and “control.”  
 Section 8-501(a) of the March 1992 Draft provided:  “The 
term ‘securities account entitlement’ means the rights of an account 
holder against a financial intermediary with respect to a security 
specified in subsections (b),[60] (c),[61] and (d)[62] of this section.”  Sec-
tion 9-304 of that draft provided that “a security interest in invest-
ment property[63] may be perfected by the secured party having 
control over the security[64].”  Under that draft a secured party 
would have “control” over a securities account entitlement if the 
secured party or its designee were the account holder65 or if: 
by written agreement among the debtor, the financial in-
termediary, and the secured party, the financial intermedi-
ary has agreed to act on the account orders of the secured 
party, without specific notice to or consent from the debtor, 
to transfer the security to the secured party or to any other 
person designated by the secured party.66 
58  Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 8, Investment Securities 
(with Conforming Amendments to Articles 1 and 9), with Prefatory Note and 
Comments (March 12, 1992) [hereinafter March 1992 Draft] (on file with authors). 
59 Note that this term is the forebear of the term “security entitlement” under 
current law.  See supra note 35. 
60  U.C.C. § 8-501(b) (account holder, as against financial intermediary, has 
right to have intermediary take action so that account holder has benefit of rights 
against issuer, such as voting rights). 
61 March 1992 Draft, § 8-501(c) (account holder, as against financial interme-
diary, has right to have intermediary comply with authorized account orders pur-
suant to UCC section 8-503). 
62  Id., § 8-501(d) (account holder, as against financial intermediary, has right 
to require intermediary to take steps to convert securities account entitlement to 
other form of securities holding). 
63 Id.,§ 9-105(1)(j) (defining “investment property” as “a security (defined in 
Section 8-102) or a securities account entitlement (defined in Section 8-501) to a 
security”). 
64  The term “investment property,” instead of the term “security,” probably 
should have been used here. 
65 March 1992 Draft, supra note 58, § 9-304(7)(d). 
66 Id. at § 9-304(7)(e).  Note that subparagraphs (7)(d) and (7)(e) mistakenly 
refer to “a securities entitlement” instead of a “securities account entitlement.”  
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 The next public draft was prepared for the 1992 Annual 
Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, July 30–August 6, 1992 (1992 Annual Meeting Draft67).  
The 1992 Annual Meeting Draft further refined the approach for 
dealing with control of securities account entitlements but without 
incorporating any major policy changes.  Section 8-104 of that draft 
provided: 
(a) In this Article “securities account entitlement” means
the claim of a person against a broker or custodian in re-
spect of a security or securities account entitlement that the 
broker or custodian 
(1) has undertaken to hold on behalf of the person; and
(2) itself holds, or is to hold, in any form other than those
specified in subsection (b)(i) or (b)(ii).
(b) A customer of a broker or custodian who has a claim
against the broker or custodian in respect of a security is to
be treated as owner of the security, rather than as the hold-
er of a securities account entitlement against the broker or 2
custodian, only if:
(1) the security is registered in the name of, payable to the
order of, or specially indorsed to the customer, and has not
been indorsed to the broker or custodian or in blank; or
(2) the security is registered in the name of the broker or
custodian as fiduciary for the owner, who is specifically
identified on the records of the issuer.
The 1992 Annual Meeting Draft continued the approach of the 
previous draft for perfection of a security interest in a security ac-
count entitlement by control, but it added some additional detail.  
Section 9-304(7) of that draft provided: 
(7) A security interest in investment property is perfected:
(a) if the secured party has control over the investment
property;
67  U.C.C. § 8 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Annual Meeting Draft, 
1992) [hereinafter 1992 Annual Meeting Draft] (on file with authors). 
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(b) if the collateral is a securities account entitlement and
the security interest is granted by the account holder to the
financial intermediary through which the securities account
entitlement is held;
(c) if the debtor is a broker; or
(d) if the debtor is not broker and a financing statement is
filed.
Paragraph (7)(b) added the important feature of so-called “au-
tomatic” perfection when an account holder grants a security inter-
est in a securities account entitlement to its own intermediary.68 
 Following the 1992 Annual Meeting, the final public draft of 
1992 was produced (October 1992 Draft).69  The October 1992 Draft 
generally carried forward the policy and substance of the 1992 An-
nual Meeting Draft.  Section 8-104 of the October 1992 Draft pro-
vided: 
(a) In this Article “securities account entitlement” means
the rights of a person against a financial intermediary and
interest of the person in the property held by the financial
intermediary in respect of a financial asset70 as to which the
financial intermediary has undertaken to treat the person as
beneficially entitled to the rights that comprise the financial
asset.
(b) If a financial intermediary holds a financial asset on be-
half of another, the other is to be treated as holding the fi-
nancial asset directly, rather than as the holder of a securi-
ties account entitlement against the financial intermediary,
only if the financial asset is registered in the name of, paya-
68  That feature now is incorporated into the concept of “control” of a security 
entitlement.  U.C.C. § 8-106(e) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011-12) (“If 
an interest in a security entitlement is granted by the entitlement holder to the en-
titlement holder’s own securities intermediary, the securities intermediary has 
control.”). 
69  U.C.C. § 8 (with Conforming Amendments to Article 9) (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Draft, Oct. 6, 1992) [hereinafter October 1992 Draft] (on file 
with authors). 
70  Id. § 8-105(a)(7) (defining “financial asset” to include ”a security” as well 
as other assests susceptible of being credited to a securities account). 
2017] BOOK ENTRY SECURITIES IN JAPAN 779 
ble to the order of, or specially indorsed to the other, and 
has not been indorsed to the financial intermediary or in 
blank.71 
Section 9-603 of that draft provided, in part: 
If the owner of a security or a securities account entitlement 
has granted an interest in the security or securities account 
entitlement to a secured party or to a repo claimant, the fol-
lowing rules determine whether the secured party or repo 
claimant has “control” over the security or a securities ac-
count entitlement: 
. . . . 
(c) A secured party or repo claimant has control over a se-
curities account entitlement if:
(1) the secured party or repo claimant is designated as the
account holder of the securities account entitlement on the
records of the financial intermediary through which the se-
curities account entitlement is held; or
(2) the debtor or transferor of the securities account enti-
tlement remains designated as the account holder, but by
written agreement among the debtor or transferor, the fi-
nancial intermediary through which the securities account
entitlement is held, and the secured party or repo claimant,
the financial intermediary has agreed that it will comply
with account orders originated by the secured party or repo
claimant, without further notice to or consent from the
debtor or transferor.72
71 Id. § 8-104. 
72  Id. § 9-603(c).  The Reporter’s Notes to section 9-603 explained: 
Although the defined term “control” is new, the concept is not.  In essence, what 
the sections using this concept do is to place on a sound legal foundation the actu-
al current practices of the securities industry.  In repo transactions, for example, it 
is already quite common that a person who is advancing value on the security of 
investment securities enters into contractual arrangements with a third party cus-
todian who agrees to hold the securities for the benefit of both the owner and the 
person advancing value, with the person advancing the value having the right to 
instruct the custodian as to the disposition of the securities in the event that the 
value is not repaid.  Today, the legal effect of such arrangements rests on manipu-
lation of the concept of “possession.” 
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Finally, Section 9-304 of the October 1992 Draft provided, in 
part: 
(7) A security interest in investment property is perfected:
(a) if the secured party has control over the investment
property;
(b) if the collateral is a securities account entitlement and
the security interest is granted by the account holder to the
financial intermediary through which the securities account
entitlement is held;
. . . .73 
During the process leading to the 1994 Article 8 Revisions, the 
Drafting Committee continued to refine the role and concept of 
control and the relevant definitions.  However, the overall contours 
were well established early in the process as described in the fore-
going discussion of the four 1992 public Drafts.  While the control 
concept included a credit to a purchaser’s securities account— 
equivalent to a book-entry security interest by outright assignment 
(jō to tanpo) under the Japanese BETA74—it also embraced the CA 
approach of control through a control agreement without the ne-
cessity of a book entry.  
2.1.2.  Geneva Securities Convention 
 Article 12 of the GSC makes provision for the acquisition of 
an interest in intermediated securities other than by way of a credit 
to a securities account of an acquirer.75  Under Article 12(1) such an 
acquisition is achieved if the account holder so agrees76 and one of 
three conditions applies, if the relevant “Contracting State has 
Id. at Reporter’s Note 2. 
73 Id. § 9-304(7). 
74 See generally infra Part 4. 
75 See GSC, supra note 7, art. 11 (regulating methods of acquisition and dis-
position other than by debit and credit). 
76 GSC, supra note 7, art. 12(1)(a). 
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made a declaration” with respect to that condition.77  Article 12(3) 
provides: 
3. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1(b) are as fol-
lows:
(a) the person to whom the interest is granted is the rele-
vant intermediary;78 
(b) a designating entry in favour of that person has been
made; 
(c) a control agreement in favour of that person applies.79
Subparagraphs (a) and (c) of Article 12(3) parallel the control 
concept under UCC Article 8.80  Neither the BETA nor the UCC 
adopt the designating entry method creating an effective interest.81  
As defined in the GSC, a “control agreement” is an agreement “be-
tween an account holder, the relevant intermediary and another 
person” (e.g., a creditor holding a security interest or another 
transferee).82  A control agreement may be negative or positive or 
both.  A negative control agreement provides that the relevant in-
termediary may not comply with the account holder’s instructions 
without the other person’s (i.e., the transferee’s) consent.83  Nega-
tive control offers the benefit of preventing dissipation of the trans-
ferred securities.  A positive control agreement provides that the 
relevant intermediary is required to comply with the other per-
77 GSC, supra note 7, art. 12(1)(b).  A Contracting State may include one or 
more of the conditions in its declaration or it may choose not to make any declara-
tion.  GSC, supra note 7, art. 12(5)(a). 
78 See GSC, supra note 7, art. 1(g) (defining “relevant intermediary” with re-
spect to a securities account as “the intermediary that maintains that securities ac-
count for the account holder”).  
79 GSC, supra note 7, art. 12(3). 
80 See generally supra Part 2.1.1. 
81 A designating entry has the same effects as a control agreement under the 
GSC except that a designating entry involves an actual entry in the records of a 
security account but without debiting (withdrawing) the relevant securities from 
the account.  See GSC, supra note 7, art. 1(l) (defining “designating entry”). 
82 GSC, supra note 7, art. 1(k).  A control agreement also may, “if so provided 
by the non-Convention law, [be] between an account holder and the relevant in-
termediary or between an account holder and another person of which the rele-
vant intermediary receives notice[.]”  Id. 
83 GSC, supra note 7, art. 1(k)(i). 
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son’s instructions “without any further consent of the account 
holder.”84  Positive control facilitates, for example, a transferee’s 
enforcement of a security interest by disposition of securities upon 
the account holder’s default.  From a functional perspective, as 
with a physical pledge of certificated securities, a control agree-
ment deprives the account holder of the power to dispose of the 
securities or provides such power to the transferee, or both. 
 UNIDROIT’s Restricted Study Group on Harmonised Sub-
stantive Rules regarding Securities Held with an Intermediary be-
gan its work in 2002.85  In November 2004 the Restricted Study 
Group issued the first draft of its Preliminary Draft Convention on 
Harmonised Substantive Rules Regarding Securities held with an 
Intermediary.86  In addition to providing for the acquisition and 
disposition of securities held with an intermediary by credit and 
debit,87 Article 4 of that draft provided specifically for the creation 
of a security interest (a term not defined in the draft) in such secu-
rities or over a securities account.88  Under Article 4, such a security 
interest in favor of the relevant intermediary would be effective if 
the account holder and relevant intermediary so agree, without 
any further step.89  A security interest in favor of a person other 
than the relevant intermediary would be effective against third 
parties only if (i) the securities or securities account were designat-
ed “in a manner such that the relevant intermediary is committed 
to complying with any requirements which that other person may 
impose with respect to those securities or that securities ac-
84 GSC, supra note 7, art. 1(k)(ii). 
85 UNIDROIT, STUDY LXXVIII DOC. 5, SUMMARY REPORT, RESTRICTED STUDY
GROUP ON ITEM 1 OF THE PROJECT:  HARMONISED SUBSTANTIVE RULES FOR THE USE OF
SECURITIES HELD WITH INTERMEDIARIES AS COLLATERAL (2002), http://.unidroit.org/
english/documents/2002/study78/s-78-005-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6M2-
89SY]. 
86 UNIDROIT, STUDY LXXVIII DOC. 18, PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON 
HARMONISED SUBSTANTIVE RULES REGARDING SECURITIES HELD WITH AN
INTERMEDIARY (2004), http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2004/
study78/s-78-018.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6ZC-VWT8] [hereinafter November 
2004 Draft Convention].  The UNIDROIT Secretariat subsequently prepared Ex-
planatory Notes to the Preliminary Draft Convention.  UNIDROIT, STUDY LXXVIII 
DOC. 19, PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON HARMONISED SUBSTANTIVE RULES 
REGARDING SECURITIES HELD WITH AN INTERMEDIARY (2004), http://
www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2004/study78/s-78-019-e.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C5S9-MMAE]. 
87 November 2004 Draft Convention, supra note 86, art. 3(1)–(3).  
88 Id. art. 4.  As to security interests in securities accounts, see infra Part 2.2. 
89 Id. art. 4(1)(a). 
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count[,]”90 and (ii) the relevant intermediary causes the securities 
account and relevant account statements “to be so annotated as to 
indicate the existence of the security interest.”91  This latter method 
applicable to other persons appears to be a precursor to the desig-
nating entry method of effectiveness ultimately adopted as an al-
ternative in the GSC.92 
 A second version of the preliminary draft convention 
emerged from the First Session of the Committee of Governmental 
Experts.93  The June 2005 Draft Convention replaced the somewhat 
cumbersome defined term “securities held with an intermediary” 
with the defined term “intermediated securities.”94  Article 6 of the 
June 2005 Draft Convention replaced Article 4 of the previous 
draft.  Article 6(1) provided that a security interest in intermediat-
ed securities is effective against third parties upon an account 
holder’s agreement with a “collateral taker” (a term not defined in 
the draft) as to the grant of the security interest95 and “delivering 
the intermediated securities into the possession or control of the 
collateral taker in accordance with paragraph 2[.]”96  Paragraph 2 
then specified the methods of taking “possession or control” of in-
termediated securities:  (i) credit of the intermediated securities to 
an account of the collateral taker,97 (ii) the relevant intermediary is 
the collateral taker,98 (iii) a designating entry is made in favor of 
the collateral taker,99 (iv) a control agreement is entered into in fa-
90 Id. art. 4(1)(b). 
91 Id. art. 4(2). 
92 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
93 UNIDROIT, STUDY LXXVIII DOC. 24, PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON
HARMONISED SUBSTANTIVE RULES REGARDING INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES (2005), 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2005/study78/s-78-024-e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R26Q-55ZG] [hereinafter June 2005 Draft Convention].  The 
UNIDROIT Secretariat subsequently prepared a final report on the first session.  
UNIDROIT, STUDY LXXVIII DOC. 23, FINAL REPORT, FIRST SESSION, UNIDROIT
COMMITTEE OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS FOR THE PREPARATION OF A DRAFT
CONVENTION ON HARMONISED SUBSTANTIVE RULES REGARDING SECURITIES HELD WITH 
AN INTERMEDIARY (2005), http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2005/
study78/s-78-023rev-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS8N-AR4K]. 
94 See June 2005 Draft Convention, supra note 93, art. 1(f) (defining “interme-
diated securities” as “the rights of an account holder resulting from a credit of se-
curities to a securities account”). 
95 Id. art. 6(1)(a). 
96 Id. art. 6(1)(b). 
97 Id. art. 6(2)(a). 
98 Id. art. 6(2)(b). 
99 Id. art. 6(2)(c).  This method and the control agreement method mentioned 
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vor of the collateral taker, (v) the securities are held or designated 
in another manner specified in the relevant Contracting State’s dec-
laration as being sufficient under that state’s law for the intermedi-
ated securities to be in the collateral takers possession or control.100  
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the definitions of 
“control agreement” and “designating entry” in the June 2005 
Draft were substantially the same as those ultimately included in 
the GSC.101 
As was the case in the development of the 1994 Article 8 Revi-
sions, early on in the Committee of Governmental Experts stage of 
the GSC a consensus emerged that providing a third party with the 
power to instruct an account holder’s intermediary was a touch-
stone for third party effectiveness of an interest in intermediated 
securities. 102  And, as explained above, in each process the CA ap-
proach was embraced as a practical means of conferring such pow-
er.  Also in each process, a consensus emerged that when the trans-
feree of an interest was the account holder’s own intermediary, no 
further effectiveness (perfection) step was necessary.  Given the in-
ternational nature of the process for developing the GSC, it is un-
surprising that a more flexible approach was adopted, involving 
declarations by Contracting States as to the methods of effective-
ness against third parties and inclusion of an additional method, 
designating entries.  Given the more local nature of the UCC revi-
sion process, however, it also is unsurprising that the 1994 Article 8 
Revisions adopted the filing of a financing statement as a perfec-
tion method for investment property under UCC Article 9.103  But 
the strong common thread through both processes is the recogni-
tion that interests of efficiency and practicality dictate the adoption 
of methods of transferring interests in intermediated securities 
without formal book entries. 
next apply only if the relevant Contracting State has declared that a designating 
entry or control agreement is sufficient under that state’s law for the intermediat-
ed securities to be in the collateral takers possession or control.  Id.  
100 Id. art. 6(2)(f). 
101 Id. art. 1(m) (defining “control agreement”); id. art. 1(n) (defining “desig-
nating entry”); see supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
102 See UNIDROIT, STUDY LXXVIII DOC. 7, SUMMARY REPORT, RESTRICTED 
STUDY GROUP ON ITEM 1 OF THE PROJECT:  HARMONISED SUBSTANTIVE RULES 
REGARDING SECURITIES HELD WITH AN INTERMEDIARY 10 (2003), 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2003/study78/s-78-007-e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CL3J-ZSNM] (mentioning perfection by control). 
103 U.C.C. § 9-115(4)(b), Appendix XII (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1994). 
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2.2.  Security Interests in Securities Accounts. 
 Once one accepts the principle that the acquisition of an in-
terest in intermediated securities may be made effective against 
third parties under the CA approach, without book entries, ac-
ceptance of the SA approach is a simple and logical next step.  It is 
interesting, however, that in the drafting processes leading to the 
1994 Article 8 Revisions of UCC Article 8 and to the GSC, it was the 
SA approach that surfaced earlier in the processes. 
2.2.1.  UCC Articles 8 and 9 
 Under UCC Article 9, a security interest in a securities ac-
count is a function of a description of collateral.  Section 9-108(d) 
provides: 
(d) [Investment property.]  Except as otherwise provided in
subsection (e), a description of a security entitlement, secu-
rities account, or commodity account is sufficient if it de-
scribes:
(1) the collateral by those terms or as investment property;
or
(2) the underlying financial asset or commodity contract.
The Official Comment to Section 9-108 further explicates the 
meaning of the compact language of subsection (d): 
[G]iven the broad definition of “securities account” in sec-
tion 8-501, a security interest in a securities account also in-
cludes all other rights of the debtor against the securities in-
termediary arising out of the securities account.  . . .
Moreover, describing collateral as a securities account is a
simple way of describing all of the security entitlements
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carried in the account.104 
Section 9-203(h) further provides:  “The attachment of a securi-
ty interest in a securities account is also attachment of a security in-
terest in the security entitlements carried in the securities ac-
count.”105  This approach is complemented by Section 9-204(a):  
“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) [relating to con-
sumer goods and commercial tort claims], a security agreement 
may create or provide for a security interest in after-acquired col-
lateral.”106 
 This description-oriented approach to creating a security in-
terest in a securities account is consistent with the thrust of the 
February 1992 Draft, which also treated the question of whether 
one could create a security interest in a securities account (i.e., in 
all securities from time to time credited to the account) merely as a 
function of the description of collateral.  Section 8-603(1) of that 
draft provided: 
Any description of collateral in a written security agree-
ment is sufficient if it reasonably identifies the securities.  A 
description identifying the collateral as all securities, or all 
securities of a given category, is sufficient.  A description spec-
ifying a certain number of shares or units is sufficient 
whether or not specific securities are identified by certifi-
cate number or the like.107 
In this context, “all securities now or hereafter credited to” a 
specified securities account, for example, would be “securities of a 
given category” within the meaning of the draft provision.108  Giv-
104 U.C.C. § 9-108, cmt. 4. 
105 U.C.C. § 9-203(h). 
106 U.C.C. § 9-204(a); see also U.C.C. § 9-108, cmt. 5 (“[I]f the collateral consists 
of a securities account or commodity account, a description of the account is suffi-
cient to cover all existing and future security entitlements or commodity contracts 
carried in the account.”). 
107 February 1992 Draft, supra note 55, § 8-603(1) (emphasis added). 
108 Clearly this was the Reporter’s intention: 
The American Bar Association Section of Business Law Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on the Settlement of Market Transactions has recommended that 
some device be made available to permit the creation and perfection of 
security interests in all of the securities held by a person in an account at 
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en that prior to the 1994 Article 8 Revisions a book entry was not 
required for the transfer of an interest in securities credited to a se-
curities account,109 adopting this description-based approach was 
quite sensible.  The March 1992 Draft closely followed the ap-
proach of the February 1992 Draft in this context.110 
 Two provisions of the 1992 Annual Meeting Draft addressed 
more directly a security interest in a securities account.  Section 9-
110(b)(2) of that draft provided, with respect to a description of col-
lateral: 
(b) In a security agreement or financing statement covering
investment property:
. . . . 
(2) a description identifying the collateral as all or a certain
quantity of securities or securities account entitlement or all
or a certain quantity of securities or securities account enti-
tlement of a given category, or all or a certain quantity of secu-
rities or securities account entitlement held through a certain ac-
                                                                                                                             
a financial intermediary.  The specific device suggested by the ABA 
Committee was to permit the creation and perfection of a security inter-
est in the securities account itself, as distinguished from a security inter-
est in the securities held in that account.  This section seeks to accomplish 
the same objective in a different fashion which, the Reporter believes, 
will be simpler and less likely to give rise to conceptual confusion that 
could result in uncertainty and unfortunate judicial decisions.  Under 
this section the question whether a debtor is granting a security interest 
in one or more specific securities, or in a group of securities, or in all secu-
rities that it holds in a certain account with a certain financial intermediary, or 
in all securities that the debtor holds in whatever place or form, is treated 
simply as a matter of description of the collateral in the security agree-
ment.  This is the same approach taken in Article 9 for other forms of 
property. 
Id., Reporter’s Notes (emphasis added). 
109 Under the 1978 U.C.C. Official Text, in the context of a securities account, 
a transfer of security interest would occur after a debtor signed a security agree-
ment describing a security and “at the time a written notification . . . signed by the 
debtor . . . is received by . . . a financial intermediary on whose books the interest 
of the transferor [debtor] in the security appears[.]”  U.C.C., § 8-313(1)(h)(i) (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1978).  Such a transfer was a necessary and suffi-
cient method of attachment and perfection of a security interest as well.  Id., § 8-
321(1), (2). 
110 See March 1992 Draft, supra note 58, §§ 9-110 (sufficiency of description of 
investment property in security agreement);  9-203, Reporter’s Note 3 (closely fol-
lowing Reporter’s Notes to February 1992 Draft § 8-603, quoted supra note 107). 
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count is sufficient.111 
Section 9-319 of the 1992 Annual Meeting Draft addressed even 
more explicitly a security interest in a securities account.  Section 9-
319 (“Security Interests in all Securities Account Entitlements in an 
Account”) provided: 
Except as otherwise provided in a security agreement, if a 
security agreement covers investment property and the de-
scription of the collateral indicates, by any form of words, 
that the debtor intended to grant a security interest in all 
securities account entitlements held in an account with a fi-
nancial intermediary, or in the account itself, then: 
(a) the security interest also attaches to all rights of the ac-
count holder against the financial intermediary arising out
of the account, including credit balances whether or not
they are proceeds of investment property, whether or not
the rights would, taken individually, fall within the defini-
tion of investment property;
(b) any method of perfection that suffices to perfect a secu-
rity interest in security account entitlements held in the ac-
count suffices to perfect the other rights described in sub-
section (a); and
(c) the security interest in the other rights described in sub-
section (a) has the same priority as the security interest in
the securities account entitlements.
The October 1992 Draft’s treatment of a security interest in se-
curities account was consistent with the earlier drafts.  Section 9-
110 of that Draft was consistent with the corresponding provision 
in the 1992 Annual Meeting Draft and Section 9-608 of that Draft 
was closely patterned on Section 9-319 of the 1992 Annual Meeting 
Draft.112 
111 1992 Annual Meeting Draft, supra note 67, § 9-110(2)(b)(2) (emphasis add-
ed). 
112 Compare October 1992 Draft, supra note 69, §§ 9-110(2)(b), 9-608, with 1992 
Annual Meeting Draft, supra note 67, §§ 9-910, 9-319.  
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2.2.2.  Geneva Securities Convention 
Article 12(4) of the GSC provides: 
An interest in intermediated securities may be granted un-
der this Article so as to be effective against third parties: 
(a)in relation to a securities account (and such an interest
extends to all intermediated securities from time to time 
standing to the credit of the relevant securities account); 
(b)in relation to a specified category, quantity, propor-
tion or value of the intermediated securities from time to 
time standing to the credit of a securities account. 
It seems clear enough that an interest in intermediated securi-
ties credited to a securities account, as contemplated by subpara-
graph (a) of Article 12(4), would be a “specified category” of in-
termediated securities as contemplated by subparagraph (b).  
However, subparagraph (a) leaves no doubt that it adopts explicit-
ly the SA approach.113  As noted in the Official Commentary, Arti-
cle 12(4) “[i]s in accordance with commercial practices in many ju-
risdictions[.]”114 
 The Restricted Study Group’s preliminary draft considered 
by the First Session of the Committee of Governmental Experts, the 
November 2004 Draft Convention, also explicitly embraced the SA 
approach.  Article 4(3) of that draft provided:  “A security interest 
created with respect to a securities account under this Article has 
effect with respect to all securities from time to time credited to 
that securities account, without the need for any further identifica-
tion of particular securities.”115  The June 2005 Draft Convention 
113 However, under Article 12(5)(c), a Conracting State may declare that ei-
ther or both subparagraphs of Article 12(4) are not applicable and under Article 
12(5)(d) that subparagraph (b) applies with modifications.  Geneva Securities 
Convention art. 12(4)(c), (d), Oct. 9, 2009.  See HIDEKI KANDA, ET AL., OFFICIAL 
COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON SUBSTANTIVE RULES FOR
INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES 81 (2012) [hereinafter OFFICIAL COMMENTARY] (noting 
that “[n]ot all jurisdictions are familiar with or may want to include such determi-
nations [as provided in paragraph (4)] of the subject matter of an interest”). 
114 OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 113, at 81. 
115 November 2004 Draft Convention, supra note 86, art. 4(3). 
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contained a similar provision.116 
3. OVERVIEW OF PROPOSALS FOR CA-SA APPROACH AND
TRANSACTIONAL ROLES OF AGREEMENTS SUPPLEMENTING CONTROL 
AGREEMENTS 
 We have proposed that Japan adopt the CA-SA approach for 
transfers of interests in book-entry securities governed by the 
BETA.  Under this proposal a transfer of an interest in securities 
would be effective against third parties if perfected by book-entry 
(i.e., a book-entry pledge, book-entry jō to tanpo transfer, or other 
book-entry transfer) under current law or by control.  Control 
would consist of an agreement by the account holder to create the 
interest and a control agreement entered into among, or binding 
upon, the account holder/transferor, the relevant intermediary, 
and the transferee.117  Note that this proposal would extend the CA 
116 The June 2005 Draft Convention provided: 
A security interest may be granted under this Article in terms such that it 
extends to all intermediated securities from time to time standing to the 
credit of the relevant securities account or, if the domestic non-
Convention law so permits, to a specified category, quantity, proportion 
or value of such intermediated securities.  Such a security interest is ef-
fective without the need for further identification of particular securities. 
June 2005 Draft Convention, supra note 93, art. 6(3).  The concept of the SA ap-
proach emerged early in the process.  See UNIDROIT, STUDY LXXVIII DOC. 11, 
SUMMARY REPORT: RESTRICTED STUDY GROUP ON ITEM 1 OF THE PROJECT: HARMONIZED 
SUBSTANTIVE RULES REGARDING SECURITIES HELD WITH AN INTERMEDIARY 6 (2003), 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2003/study78/s-78-011-e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8DXK-L2AC] (proposal for “transfer [of] a securities account 
without necessarily identifying the securities in the account”). 
117  We take no position here on whether Japan, in adopting the CA ap-
proach, should adopt a negative control approach, a positive control approach, 
both approaches, or either approach in the alternative.  See supra Part 2.1.2. (dis-
cussing positive and negative control).  We emphasize here the principle rather 
than the details.  However, positive control has the advantage of permitting the 
transferee to enforce its interest, without relying on the transferor’s cooperation, 
by instructing the intermediary to dispose of securities credited to the securities 
account.  It is unclear, however, whether such an act of enforcement would be 
permitted without resort to a court—a question that should be answered in any 
legislation adopting the CA-SA approach.  See Souichirou Kozuka & Naoe Fujisa-
wa, Old Ideas Die Hard?: An Analysis of the 2004 Reformation of Secured Transactions 
Law in Japan and its Impact on Banking Practices, 31 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 293, 296–97 
& n. 16 (2009) [hereinafter Kozuka & Fujisawa, Old Ideas] (expressing the view that 
in general “self help” remedies without resort to a court are not permitted “except 
in highly exceptional situations,” but that a court likely would uphold such self 
2017] BOOK ENTRY SECURITIES IN JAPAN 791 
approach to security interests, including outright title transfers for 
security (jō to tanpo) and to outright title transfers not for purposes 
of security.118  Under the SA approach advanced here, the securi-
ties covered by such an interest perfected by control could, if so 
agreed by the account holder-transferor, consist of all securities 
from time to time credited to a securities account and could be de-
scribed in the agreement of the parties as an interest in the securi-
ties account itself.  Finally, adoption of the CA-SA approach neces-
sarily would require the enactment of appropriate priority rules 
and “cut-off” or “takes free” rules for competing interests.119 
 Figure III.1 reflects the alternative methods of transferring 
effective interests under the BETA and as they would be modified 
by adoption of the CA approach. 
FIGURE III.1 
SUMMARY OF METHODS OF TRANSFER 
help if so agreed by the parties in advance) (citing Saikō  Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jul. 
14, 1998, Hei 7 (o オ), KK Tokyo Mitsubishi Ginko v. Trustee of KK Creative 
World, 52 (5) SAIKŌ  SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ  [MINSHŪ ] 1261, 1268–69).  
118  See infra Part 5.1 (discussing outright transfers perfected by control). 
119  See infra Part 5.3 (discussing proposed priority rules). 
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 The concepts of “control” of a security entitlement under the 
UCC and “control agreement” under the GSC focus narrowly on 
the right to give and the obligation to obey entitlement orders and 
instructions, respectively, with respect to securities accounts.120  
But the parties to an agreement providing for control also may 
agree to a number of supplemental rights and obligations.  For ex-
ample, a transferee of a security interest in intermediated securities 
may be entitled to give instructions to an intermediary only follow-
ing a debtor’s default or following the transferee’s notification to 
the intermediary that a default has occurred.  Or, an account hold-
er may be entitled to trade and make withdrawals and substitu-
tions with respect to intermediated securities only if no default has 
occurred and the value of the relevant securities equals or exceeds 
an agreed borrowing base (such as a ratio between the collateral 
value and the secured obligations, ensuring a “cushion” of collat-
eral value).  Or, the intermediary or the transferee may agree to 
subordinate its interest to the other’s existing or future interest in 
the securities credited to the securities account.  Such supplemental 
agreements frequently are referred to colloquially as “terms” of a 
“control agreement,” although they do not actually relate to the 
more narrow agreements that actually serve to confer perfection by 
control on a transferee.  
 It is plausible that securities intermediaries in Japan might 
be hesitant to enter into such supplemental agreements that could 
expose them to liability to a transferee—at least without being 
compensated for such risks.  Similar concerns were expressed dur-
ing the process of developing the 1994 Article 8 Revisions, but the 
conclusion reached then was to leave the matter to the market.121  
120 See supra Part 2.1 
121 See U.C.C. § 8-106(g) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014-15) (secu-
rities intermediary not required to enter into control agreement even if directed by 
entitlement holder).  Consider the following explanation: [T]he Drafting Commit-
tee confronted a particularly important question related to control:  What if the 
securities intermediary refuses to agree to comply with the secured party’s (or an-
other purchaser’s) instructions?  Revised Article 8 answers this question by leav-
ing the subject largely to the parties and the market.  If a securities intermediary is 
unwilling to accede to an entitlement holder’s request that it comply with the se-
cured party’s instructions, the entitlement holder retains the right and ability to 
employ a different intermediary who will so agree.  Nevertheless, Revised Article 
8 makes it clear that a securities intermediary is free to refuse to enter into such an 
agreement.  The Drafting Committee recognized that it would be inappropriate to 
require by statute that a securities intermediary deal with, take instructions from, 
or acknowledge the rights of a stranger with whom it has not agreed to deal.  
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Consider, however, the experience with such supplemental agree-
ments in the United States during the past almost two decades.122  
For retail customers of broker-dealer intermediaries who wish to 
obtain credit secured by securities credited to securities accounts, 
the norm remains to borrow from the customer’s intermediary un-
der a (so-called) “margin” lending arrangement.  In other contexts, 
some securities intermediaries in the United States generally have 
been willing to enter into only “plain vanilla” control agreements 
that do not involve any such supplemental agreements.  For exam-
ple, the simplest, most straightforward control agreement would 
provide that the intermediary would obey instructions of the trans-
feree (affirmative control) and would not obey instructions of the 
account holder (negative control).  Some intermediaries resist ar-
rangements under which they would have to comply with instruc-
tions from an account holder and from a control agreement benefi-
ciary during the same period.  For example, an account holder 
might be permitted to trade (e.g., buy and sell, but not withdraw or 
transfer “free” and not against payment) securities until the inter-
mediary receives a notification from the control agreement benefi-
ciary that it has assumed exclusive control—after which time only 
that beneficiary (not the account holder) would be entitled to give 
instructions. 
For substantial customers in certain large transactions, more 
elaborate supplemental agreements have been common.  Whether 
an intermediary will agree to assume significant responsibilities in 
connection with a control agreement arrangement may depend on 
Mooney, Rocks & Schwartz, supra note 51, at 1897 (footnotes omitted). 
122  The discussion of supplemental agreements in the text that follows draws 
on Telephone Interview with Sandra M. Rocks, Counsel, and Penelope L. Chris-
tophorou, Counsel, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLC (Nov. 12,  2015).  Note 
that it is the experience with agreements supplemental to control agreements un-
der Revised Article 8 (which had become widely enacted by the late 1990s) that is 
most relevant.  The 1977 version of UCC Article 8 permitted perfection of a securi-
ty interest by mere notification to a debtor’s intermediary, even without the in-
termediary’s agreement.  See U.C.C., § 8-321(1), (2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1978) (providing that appropriate transfer  results in a perfected security 
interest).  However, this structure was based on the concept of perfection by pos-
session through notification to a bailee in actual possession of collateral.  U.C.C., § 
9-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1978) (“. . . the secured party is deemed
to have possession from the time the bailee [in possession] receives notification of
the secured party’s interest.”).  Many supplemental agreements as envisioned
here were suspect under the 1997 version.  This was because permitting the debtor
access to securities credited to a securities account, such as by permission to trade
or withdraw securities, would have jeopardized the secured party’s deemed “pos-
session” and consequently the perfected status of a security interest.
794 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
whether the intermediary will be appropriately compensated for 
its services or responsibilities.  Consider, for example, the roles of 
major custodian banks (intermediaries) in tri-party repo transac-
tions.123  In such transactions the custodian may monitor collateral 
values, select the securities to be the subject of the transactions, and 
perform other duties.  This is a fee-generating product line for such 
custodians.  Of course, before a Japanese intermediary would un-
dertake any such responsibilities it would be necessary for it to 
comply with all applicable regulatory requirements and to satisfy 
Japanese regulators that such supplemental agreements would 
conform to applicable prudential standards. 
4. SECURITY INTERESTS UNDER THE JAPANESE BOOK-ENTRY
TRANSFER ACT 
Under the BETA an interest in securities can be acquired by an 
account holder only by book entries in the securities account main-
tained by an intermediary for the account holder—e.g., by a debit 
to a transferor’s account and a credit to a transferee’s account.124  
The BETA requires an intermediary to maintain a so-called 
“matched book.”  The number of units of securities of each issue 
credited by an intermediary on its books to its account holders 
must be strictly matched to the identical number of units of that is-
sue in the intermediary’s customer account on the books of 
JASDEC or another intermediary.125  (An intermediary normally 
maintains a securities account with JASDEC or another intermedi-
123 In a tri-party repo transaction the custodian maintains an account for a 
securities “seller”/funds transferee (typically a dealer) and enters into a control 
agreement for the benefit of the securities “buyer”/funds transferor.  The interest 
of the “buyer” (whether or not legally characterized as a buyer or the holder of a 
security interest) is thereby effective (perfected) as against third parties such as 
creditors of the “seller.”  Concerning tri-party repo transactions before the 1994 
revisions to UCC Article 8, see STIGUM, supra note 54 (explaining the mechanism of 
tri-party repo transaction). 
124  BETA, supra note 3, at arts. 73 (corporate debt securities), 98 (JGBs), & 140 
(corporate equity securities). 
125  BETA, supra note 3, at arts. 70 (corporate debt securities), 95 (JGBs), & 132 
(corporate equity securities).  The BETA contains detailed provisions to ensure 
that credits are offset with matching debits to the appropriate accounts.  See, e.g., 
BETA art. 70(3)-(8) (describing book-entry transfer procedures). 
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ary.126)  The intermediary’s account is divided into two sub-
accounts.127  One sub-account reflects the intermediary’s “proprie-
tary” or “ownership” holdings of securities, to which securities 
owned by the intermediary (and not maintained for its account 
holders) are credited.  The other is its “customer” sub-account, to 
which securities it manages for its account holders are credited.  
The customer sub-account normally does not identify individual 
holdings of each account holder but is an aggregated, or “omni-
bus,” account maintained by the intermediary for all of its account 
holders.  The BETA also makes provision for pledges of securities 
credited to a securities account.128  The proprietary sub-account of 
an intermediary’s securities account is further subdivided into two 
sub-accounts—a “proprietary” or “ownership” sub-account and a 
“pledge” sub-account.129  A securities account of an account holder 
that is not an intermediary also may be subdivided into a proprie-
tary or ownership sub-account and a pledge sub-account.  When 
securities are pledged to an account holder (including an interme-
diary) the securities are credited to the pledge sub-account of the 
account holder’s proprietary sub-account. 
Ownership of intermediated securities is acquired by a credit to 
the proprietary or ownership sub-account of an account holder’s 
account and a pledge to an account holder is made effective by a 
credit to the pledge sub-account of the account holder’s securities 
account.  A security interest by way of outright assignment (jō to 
tanpo) or a title transfer not for purposes of security also can be 
made effective by credit to the transferee’s proprietary or owner-
ship sub-account.  A credit to the proprietary sub-account of the 
securities account of a transferee of title (in a jō to tanpo transfer or 
other title transfer) is a necessary, as well as a sufficient, step to 
126 As to the accounts maintained by an intermediary with JASDEC or an-
other intermediary, see generally Mooney & Kanda, Core Issues, supra note 9, at 86 
& n.80. 
127  Our references here and below to sub-accounts are for clarity of exposi-
tion and not as precise translations of the term used in the relevant articles of the 
BETA, which generally refer to an “account.”  See e.g., BETA, supra note 3, at art. 
68 (regulating matters to be entered or recorded in the registry of book-entry 
transfer accounts). 
128  BETA, supra note 3, at arts. 74 (corporate debt securities), 99 (JGBs), & 141 
(corporate equity securities).  As to pledges under the BETA, see generally Mooney 
& Kanda, Core Issues, supra note 9, at 113–14 (explaining how pledges work under 
BETA). 
129  BETA, supra note 3, at arts. 68(3) (corporate debt securities), 91(3) (JGBs), 
& 129 (3) (corporate equity securities). 
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render the transfer effective against third parties and in the insol-
vency proceedings of the transferor.130  Similarly, a credit to a 
pledgee’s pledge sub-account of a pledgee’s securities account is a 
necessary and sufficient step for the effectiveness of the pledge.131  
In effect, a credit to a securities account is recognized as a precise 
analogue of the delivery of a discrete security certificate.  A pledg-
ee may choose to have a pledge of shares of stock notified to the is-
suer or it may choose to remain anonymous (except as to its debtor 
and its intermediary) in a non-registered pledge.132  A pledgee is 
presumed not to wish a pledge to be registered with the issuer un-
less it instructs its intermediary to the contrary.133  A transferee 
other than a pledgee also may wish to have the transfer remain un-
registered with the issuer, but such a transfer will be registered un-
less the transferee instructs otherwise.134 
130  BETA, supra note 3, at arts. 73 (corporate debt securities), 98 (JGBs), 140 
(corporate equity securities).  See Kinyū torihiki niokeru azukarisisan wo meguru 
hō ritsumondai kenkyūkai, Kokyakuhogo no Kanten karano Azukarishisan wo Meguru 
Seido no Arikata, 32 KINYŪ KENKYŪ , no. 4, 2013, at 25, 71–72.  By “sufficient” we 
mean that no other formality or step is required.  However, if an order to transfer 
lacks a valid intent to transfer, as when made by mistake, the resulting credit 
would not be effective.  See, Naofumi Kaneko, Syasaitō  no Furikae nikansuru 
Hō uritsu no Gaiyō , 57 MINJIGEPPŌ , no. 10, 2002, at 9, 26.  
131 BETA, supra note 3, at arts. 74 (corporate debt securities), 99 (JGBs), & 141 
(corporate equity securities).  The use of pledge accounts arguably serves as a 
weak form of public notice that the securities are pledged to the account holder as 
opposed to being proprietary assets of the account holder.  Given the use of jō to 
tanpo, however, a credit to an account holder’s proprietary account does not ne-
gate the possibility that the securities actually are held by the account holder as 
security. 
132  See Mooney & Kanda, Core Issues, supra note 9, at 114 (explaining the op-
tions of the creditor). 
133 As to pledged securities in a pledgee’s pledge account, unless the pledgee 
requests to be notified to the issuer, the pledgee will remain anonymous, i.e., the 
pledgor of shares will be reported to the issuer as the shareholder in the normal 
course.  BETA, supra note 3, at art. 151(3). 
134 As to securities credited to a transferee’s ownership subaccount of its 
proprietary account in a jō to tanpo transaction, the transferee will be reported to 
the issuer as the owner, i.e., as the shareholder in the case of shares, unless the 
transferee requests that its intermediary notify a central securities depositary (e.g., 
JASDEC), which in turn would notify the issuer, that the transferor is to remain 
the owner on the issuer’s books.  BETA, supra note 3, at art. 151(2)(i). 
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Figure IV.1 reflects the account and sub-account structure de-
scribed above. 
Now consider two examples.  In Example 1 Pledgor obtains a 
loan from Pledgee and Pledgor pledges to Pledgee securities cred-
ited to Pledgor’s securities account with Broker.  In Example 2, 
Pledgor obtains a loan from Broker and pledges to Broker, as 
pledgee, the securities credited to Pledgor’s securities account with 
Broker. 
EXAMPLE 1.  Pledgor borrows ¥10 Million from Pledgee 
and agrees to pledge 1,000 shares of Company A common 
stock to secure the loan.  Pledgor instructs Broker to trans-
fer the shares to the pledge section of the proprietary secu-
rities account of Pledgee with JASDEC.  Broker debits 
Pledgor’s account for the 1,000 shares.  JASDEC debits Bro-
ker’s customer account for the shares and credits the pledge 
section of Pledgee’s proprietary account with the shares. 
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Example 1 is illustrated by the following graphic: 
EXAMPLE 2.  Pledgor borrows ¥10 Million from Broker 
and agrees to pledge 1,000 shares of Company A common 
stock to secure the loan.  Pledgor instructs Broker to trans-
fer the shares to the pledge section of the proprietary secu-
rities account of Broker with JASDEC.  Broker debits Pledg-
or’s account for the 1,000 shares.  JASDEC debits Broker’s 
customer account for the shares and credits the pledge sec-
tion of Broker’s proprietary account with the 1,000 shares. 
(1000 A) 
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Example 2 is illustrated by the following graphic: 
In both Example 1 and Example 2 Pledgee and Broker, the re-
spective pledgees, acquire an effective pledge of the shares.  Alt-
hough Example 1 involves four participants in the pledge transac-
tion, Pledgor, Pledgee, Broker, and JASDEC, Example 2 involves 
only three participants, Pledgor, Broker, and JASDEC.  Both trans-
actional structures are quite straightforward and do not appear to 
favor or disfavor Pledgor one way or the other in terms of transac-
tion costs or ease of implementation. 
 It is generally understood that a pledgor retains proprietary 
rights in certificated securities that are pledged to a pledgee.  In the 
event of insolvency proceedings of a pledgee, the pledgor can re-
sume the clear ownership of certificated securities in the pledgee’s 
possession by discharging the secured obligation.  The pledgor is 
entitled to redeem the pledged securities possessed by the pledgee 
based on the pledgor’s ownership interest.135  In the case of a secu-
135 Kinyū torihiki niokeru azukarisisan wo meguru hō ritsumondai 
kenkyūkai, supra note 130, at 69; see HASAN HŌ  [Bankruptcy Act] art. 62 (Right of 
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rity interest transferred by means of an outright assignment (jō to 
tanpo) as well, the security interest is made effective by the pledg-
or’s delivery of the certificated securities to the pledgee.136  Even 
though structured as an outright assignment of title, jō to tanpo is 
generally recognized as a secured transaction and is treated as 
such.137  Accordingly, the commencement of a transferee’s insol-
vency proceeding (before a secured obligation’s maturity) may not 
affect the relationship between the transferor and transferee.  As 
with the possessory pledge discussed above, in the case of a jō to 
tanpo transaction the transferor retains a proprietary right in the 
certificated securities.  In the event of the transferee’s insolvency, 
the transferor could assert its right of redemption as to certificated 
securities by discharging the secured obligation.138 
Under the BETA the book entry is the fundamental concept 
that underpins the system.  It is the basis for the entire legal 
framework for establishing the rights of an account holder and the 
effectiveness of transfers of interests in book-entry securities.  As 
mentioned above,139 an interest in book-entry securities can be ac-
quired only by a book entry to an account holder’s securities ac-
count maintained by an intermediary.  Consistent with this fun-
damental concept, the effectiveness of a pledge or other transfer of 
an interest in book-entry securities also requires a credit to the 
pledgee’s or other transferee’s securities account (either in the 
pledge section or, in the case of a jō to tanpo outright assignment, 
Segregation) (providing that the commencement of bankruptcy proceeding does 
not affect the right of segregation). 
136  For corporate shares, see Kaisha-Hō  [Companies Act], Act No. 86 of 2005, 
art. 128(1) (“Transfer of shares in a Company Issuing Share Certificate shall not 
become effective unless the share certificates representing such shares are deliv-
ered; provided, however, that this shall not apply to transfer of shares that arise 
out of the disposition of Treasury Shares.”). 
137 HIROTO DŌ GAUCHI, TANPOBUKKENHŌ  298–302 (3d ed. 2008). 
138  See id. (discussing right of redemption with respect to assets generally); 
Denshitekikiroku ni motozuku kenri wo meguru hō ritsumondai kenkyūkai, Furi-
kaeshō ken/Denshikirokusaiken no Dō nyū  wo Fumaeta Hō kaishakuron no Saikentō , 34 
KINYŪ KENKYŪ , no.3, 2015, at 1, 21–27 (discussing right of redemption with respect 
to assets generally as well as securities).  We are not aware of a reported decision 
dealing the right of redemption with respect to certificated securities.  There are 
arguments for imposing “perfection” requirements on a transferor’s right of re-
demption in a jō to tanpo transaction as against a creditor of the transferee that has 
attached the transferred asset.  Saikō  Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 20, 2006, Hei 18 (ju 
受) no. 1641, 60 SAIKŌ  SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ  [MINSHŪ ] 3098 (Japan); see 
MAKOTO ITO, HASANHŌ /MINJISAISEIHŌ  451 (3d ed. 2014).  
139 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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the proprietary section).  It is clear that a pledgor retains proprie-
tary rights in securities pledged in the BETA book-entry system 
and credited to a pledgee’s pledge section and a corresponding 
right of redemption in the pledgee’s insolvency proceeding.  How-
ever, it is not clear whether a transferor in a jō to tanpo transaction 
in the BETA system would retain proprietary rights and a right of 
redemption.140  In the absence of such proprietary rights the jō to 
tanpo transferor would have only a personal, unsecured claim in 
the jō to tanpo transferee’s insolvency proceedings.  While a defini-
tive analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
significant that adoption of the CA approach through clear statuto-
ry provisions would eliminate this jō to tanpo transferee insolvency 
risk for jō to tanpo transferors in the BETA book-entry system.141  
Now consider application of the CA approach in the context of the 
jō to tanpo transferee’s insolvency in a situation similar to Example 
1. 
EXAMPLE 3.  Transferor borrows ¥10 Million from Trans-
feree and agrees to transfer in a jō to tanpo transaction 1,000 
shares of Company A common stock to secure the loan.  
Transferor, Transferee, and Broker conclude a control 
agreement covering the 1,000 shares credited to Pledgor’s 
account with Broker.  The parties agree that the 1,000 shares 
are to remain credited to Transferor’s account and that 
Transferor is free to dispose of other securities credited to 
the account.  Following the commencement of Transferee’s 
insolvency proceeding, Transferor pays to Transferee (or 
Transferee’s insolvency representative) the secured obliga-
tion.  The 1,000 shares remain credited to Transferor’s ac-
count, over which neither Transferee nor Transferee’s in-
solvency representative retains any right or interest because 
the secured obligation has been discharged.  
140  See Denshitekikiroku ni motozuku kenri wo meguru hō ritsumonndai 
kenkyūkai, supra note 138, at 27–31 (discussing jō to tanpo in connection with jō to 
tanpo transferee’s proprietary account and requirements for asserting the right of 
redemption, especially the difficulty of identifying securities in the book-entry 
system). 
141 See id. and accompanying text.  We do not intend to overemphasize this 
point, inasmuch as we understand that the issue has not been the subject of liti-
gated disputes.  However, providing additional certainty and predictability in se-
cured transactions law could only have beneficial effects at the margin. 
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5. PROPOSED REVISIONS OF JAPANESE BOOK ENTRY TRANSFER
ACT:  POLICY ANALYSIS 
In this Part we evaluate the merits of our proposal that Japa-
nese law incorporate the CA-SA approach under the BETA. 
5.1.   Conceptual Consistency of Proposal with Book Entry Transfer Act 
and Traditional Japanese Property Law 
 As explained in Part 4 with respect to certificated securities, 
a pledgor or transferor in a jō to tanpo transaction retains a proprie-
tary (ownership) interest in certificated securities, and a right of 
redemption by discharging the secured obligation, even after the 
pledgor’s or jō to tanpo transferor’s delivery of possession of the se-
curities to a pledgee or jō to tanpo transferee.  While it is unclear, a 
jō to tanpo transferor may retain such a proprietary interest and 
right of redemption with respect to book-entry securities even after 
the transferor’s account has been debited for the transferred securi-
ties (thereby removing the securities from the jō to tanpo transfer-
or’s account) and the jō to tanpo transferee’s proprietary account 
has been credited with the securities.142  If the jō to tanpo transferor 
does retain such an interest and right, then the BETA would al-
ready recognize that one entity can hold a beneficial interest for 
another entity and that one book entry can suffice as evidence for 
limited interests of two entities.  Thus, the  unitary concept of 
BETA, which embraces a unitary method of original acquisition 
solely by book-entry in favor of a single account holder,143 could 
co-exist with the jō to tanpo structure.  It already does under the 
pledge account structure, under which a jō to tanpo transferee holds 
through its intermediary both for itself as well as for the jō to tanpo 
transferor. 
142 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  While the pledgor’s retention 
of a proprietary interest is generally accepted, as noted in Part 4, there is some 
question as to whether a transferor retains such a proprietary interest in the insol-
vency proceedings of an outright transferee in a jō to tanpo transaction. 
143 See Mooney & Kanda, Core Issues, supra note 9, at 114 (providing an over-
view of the operation and functions of the BETA). 
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If the conceptual aspect of securities holding for jō to tanpo 
transfers under the BETA was recognized, it also would become 
apparent that there is no conceptual inconsistency between the 
BETA’s core principles and the CA-SA approach.  Under CA-SA an 
intermediary would recognize that securities credited to a trans-
feror’s account with the intermediary are also held by the interme-
diary for the benefit of a transferee pursuant to the intermediary’s 
control agreement.  In this way the BETA could accommodate a 
situation in which an intermediary holds for more than one benefi-
ciary. 
Consider the CA-SA approach and the BETA from a functional 
perspective.  Under the BETA the account holder is the sole holder 
of a property interest in book-entry securities to the exclusion of 
the intermediary and all other persons.  But it is the intermediary 
that has the power (even if not the right) to transfer the book-entry 
securities (such as by giving a transfer instruction to JASDEC, the 
intermediary’s (in its position as account holder) relevant interme-
diary).  Under the CA-SA approach, the account holder would re-
tain its property interest in book-entry securities (subject to a trans-
feree’s security interest), but the transferee (under an affirmative 
control structure) would, like an intermediary under the BETA, 
have the power to transfer the book-entry securities by instruction 
to the relevant intermediary. 
The CA-SA approach also may be viewed from the perspective 
of the integrity and reliability of records.  Given the nature of enti-
ties qualified to act a securities intermediaries in Japan,144 there is 
no reason to think that the evidence and details of an intermedi-
ary’s control agreement would be any less reliable than its records 
concerning book entries.  Indeed, the core principle of the book-
entry system is its reliance on intermediaries to maintain records of 
securities accounts accurately and honestly.  Moving to the CA ap-
144 Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (FIEA), Act No. 25 of 1948, as 
amended in 2006 (Act 65 of 2006) (changing title from “Securities and Exchange 
Act” to “Financial Instruments and Exchange Act”), and as amended through 
2014 (Act No. 91 of 2014), art. 2(8)(xvii) (stating that the conduct of “Financial In-
struments Business” includes acting as an intermediary for securities accounts 
under the BETA); FIEA, art. 29 (registration); FIEA, Enforcement Ordinance, art. 
15-7(1) (minimum capital); FIEA, art. 46-6(1) (capital-to-risk-ratio) (stating that 
such activity is a “Type I Financial Instruments Business” and such an intermedi-
ary is required to be registered with the Prime Minister and to meet minimum 
capital requirements and a capital-to-risk-ratio requirement); FIEA, art. 43-2(1) 
(dictating that such an intermediary also must manage securities separately from 
ists own property in accordance with an approved method).   
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proach would depend on the reliability of intermediary records no 
more and no less than under the current book-entry approach.  
Similarly, from the perspective of public notice, there would be no 
material difference between a book-entry transfer and perfection 
by a control agreement—neither would be readily available to the 
public except as disclosed by the pledgor or other transferor (ac-
count holder) or, with the pledgor’s or other transferor’s authoriza-
tion, by its intermediary.145  It follows that any objection to the CA 
approach based on the absence of public notice would not be per-
suasive.  Whatever benefits public notice requirements (such as the 
UCC filing regime and other registration regimes) provide in other 
contexts, the very existence of an account holder’s interest in book-
entry securities and in its securities account is inherently secret. A 
public notice-based objection to the CA approach would apply 
equally to book entries or to an account holder’s specification of 
the persons authorized to give instructions with respect to a securi-
ties account—an inherent aspect of any system for intermediated 
securities.  However, it would be entirely appropriate for Japan to 
provide for public filing or registration as an alternative perfection 
method in addition to perfection by book entry or control agree-
ment.146 
145  A book-entry pledge would be reflected by a debit to a pledgor’s account 
statement or, on an interim basis, in the account records as a reduction of a pledg-
or’s holdings.  A control agreement would not so appear.  However, even a third 
party with access to the account statement or records could fully rely on such rec-
ords inasmuch as they provide only a snapshot at a particular time and date.  
Subsequent withdrawals or other transfers could have been made.  The same 
comparison as between a control agreement and a designating entry in the ac-
count records would hold with respect to account statements.  See GSC art. 12(1), 
(3)(b) (dictating that grant of an interest in intermediated securities is made effec-
tive against third parties by designating entry); 1(l) (defining “designating entry”).  
Of course, if it were thought to be necessary or useful, adoption of the CA ap-
proach under Japanese law could be accompanied by a requirement that interme-
diaries make corresponding designated entries in the account records.  Alterna-
tively, another method of official recordkeeping of control agreements could be 
imposed on intermediaries, such as notifications to JASDEC (perhaps pursuant to 
JASDEC regulations).  Also, a requirement that a control agreement bear a date 
certification (kakutei hizuke), such as a date stamp by a Japanese notary, could be 
imposed. 
146 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-312(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (stat-
ing that perfection of security interest in investment property is created by filing).  
Perfection by control offers the benefit to a creditor of depriving the transferor of 
power over the securities (negative control) or providing such power to the trans-
feree (affirmative control).  Perfection by book-entry also offers the practical bene-
fits of negative and positive control.  While permitting perfection by registration 
or public notice could provide even greater flexibility to parties, an examination of 
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Note as well that the CA approach also is conceptually con-
sistent with traditional aspects of Japanese property law.  For ex-
ample, if an agent were in physical possession of movables on be-
half of its principal, it could deliver the movables to a third party 
transferee by instruction from its principal without any actual 
change of possession—a step analogous to an intermediary enter-
ing into a control agreement for the benefit of the third-party trans-
feree.147  Although the agent would hold actual physical posses-
sion, the third party transferee also would have possession as a 
result of such a delivery. From a functional perspective, both an 
agent in possession of movables and a third party transferee (re-
sulting from an instruction to the agent) would possess the power 
to transfer the movables to the exclusion of the princi-
pal/transferor.  Under the CA approach, the transferee likewise 
would acquire such power under an affirmative control arrange-
ment. 
Japanese law on the assignment of a nominative (money) claim 
under Minpō  articles 467 and 364 provides another apt example.  
Such an assignment involves an obligor, an obligee/assignor, and 
an assignee.  Article 467(1) provides that an assignment is not ef-
fective as against the obligor or any third party “unless the assign-
or gives a notice thereof to the obligor or the obligor has acknowl-
edged the same.”148  Moreover, article 467(2) provides that the 
assignment is not effective “against a third party other than the ob-
ligor unless the notice or acknowledgement is made using an in-
                                                                                                                             
the benefits of perfection by registration or public notice is beyond the scope of 
this article. 
147  See MINPŌ  [Civil Code] art. 184 (“In cases where a Thing is in an agent's 
possession, if the principal orders that agent to thenceforward possess that Thing 
on behalf of a third party, and such third party consents thereto, that third party 
shall acquire possessory rights.”); art. 183 (“If an agent manifests an intention that 
The thing possessed by it shall thenceforward be possessed on behalf of its princi-
pal, the principal shall thereby acquire possessory rights.”) (providing other ex-
amples of a transfer of possessory rights in the absenceof an actual transfer of pos-
session to a transferee); art. 181 (“Possessory rights may be acquired by an 
agent.”); art. 182 (“(1) The transfers of possessory rights shall be effected by the 
delivery of the Thing possessed.  (2) In cases where a transferee or his/her agent 
actually holds a Thing, the transfers of possessory rights may be effected by the 
parties' manifestations of intention alone.”); see also Charles W. Mooney, Jr. & 
Atsushi Kinami, Transfer, Pledge, Clearance and Settlement in the Japanese and United 
States Government Securities Markets, 12 U. Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L. 517, 537–42 (1991) 
(drawing parallels between United States and Japanese law).  
148 MINPŌ  [Civil Code] art. 467(1). 
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strument bearing a fixed date.”149  Such a notice or acknowledge-
ment pursuant to article 467 also is necessary for a pledge over a 
nominative claim to be effective as against third parties.150  A secu-
rities intermediary is analogous to an obligor on a claim, given its 
duties to its account holders.  An account holder’s transfer of an in-
terest in securities credited to its securities account (or to the ac-
count itself) likewise is analogous to an assignment of a claim.  
Clearly, then, an intermediary’s entering into a control agreement 
is analogous to an obligor’s acknowledgement of an assignment of 
a claim.  Again, the CA approach is conceptually consistent with 
Japanese property law.  On the other hand, neither the Minpō  ap-
proach nor the CA approach reflects an optimal system for perfec-
tion of assignments of claims (receivables).  A transferor typically 
would have only a small number of securities accounts that, once 
established, would be maintained and used over a substantial pe-
riod of time, thus making the CA approach feasible.  But a typical 
transferor of receivables typically would own many (hundreds or 
thousands) of receivables, many of which could be of a relatively 
short term between creation and the maturity date (e.g., thirty 
days).  In that context, requiring a notification to or an acknowl-
edgment by every obligor on the assigned receivables would be 
cumbersome and wholly impractical.  Perfection by registration or 
public notice would be preferable.151 
It generally has been understood that an actual delivery of cer-
tificated securities is required for a transfer to be effective.152  In 
particular, the Companies Act specifically so provides with respect 
149 MINPŌ  [Civil Code] art. 467(2). 
150 MINPŌ  [Civil Code] art. 364. 
151  See PRAMC, supra note 27, art. 4(1) (providing that registration of an as-
signment of a claim in the claim assignment registration file constitutes the equiv-
alent of a notice to all third parties other than the obligor made with an instru-
ment bearing a fixed date for purposes of Minpō  art. 467(2)).  While registration 
of an assignment of claims certainly is less burdensome than actually notifying 
each obligor, in the case of the assignment of existing outstanding claims it re-
mains necessary under the PRAMC to include in the registration a description of 
the assigned claims that identies obligors by name.  Registry Rules for the As-
signment of Movables and Claims, Ministry of Justice Ordinance No. 99 (2005) 
Art. 9(2); see U.C.C. § 9-504, cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) 
(stating that under the UCC, however, it would be possible to perfect an assign-
ment of receivables by filing a financing statement covering, e.g., “all of debtor’s 
receivables now existing or hereafter arising.”)   
152 This is so notwithstanding that “[a] bearer certificate of claims is deemed 
to be movable.” MINPŌ  [Civil Code] art. 83(3). 
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to share certificates.153  However, as described above,154 it is a book-
entry that effects transfer of uncertificated, book-entry securities 
under the BETA.155  Even before enactment of the Securities Depos-
itory Act,156 the BETA’s predecessor, it was strongly argued that an 
actual delivery of certificated securities should not be an absolute 
requirement for a transfer to be effective because there was no such 
legislative base for such a requirement.157  Other methods of trans-
ferring possession, such as an instruction by a principal, necessari-
ly should be permitted in order to respond to practical reality and 
necessity.158  This argument is consistent with requiring instruc-
tions to intermediaries as a condition for effective transfers in the 
book-entry system.  For book entries to replace actual deliveries in 
the book-entry system, the intermediaries must play a key role.  As 
described above, it is a book entry that effects a transfer of uncertif-
icated, book-entry securities under the BETA and the power to 
make such transfers lies with the intermediaries. 
In general, a certificated security has been understood as a de-
vice for attaching invisible “rights” to a visible piece of paper in or-
der to make the rights suitable for trading. The law of certificated 
securities (the law of negotiable instruments included) regulates 
parties’ rights and obligations in accordance with the location or 
possession of the certificated securities in order to make legal rela-
tionships certain and clear.  It follows that the law requires an actu-
al delivery of a certificate for a transfer to be effective, as explained 
above.  A possessor of a certificate is an owner unless proved oth-
153  Kaisha-Hō Companies Act, Act No. 86 of 2005, art. 128(1) (“Transfer of 
shares in a Company Issuing Share Certificate shall not become effective unless 
the share certificates representing such shares are delivered; provided, however, 
that this shall not apply to transfer of shares that arise out of the disposition of 
Treasury Shares.”); Id. arts. 687 (corporate debt securities), 255(1) (share options) 
(stating that there are similar provisions for corporaate debt securities and share 
options). 
154  See supra Part 4. 
155 Before the BETA was enacted and effective this was also the case for cer-
tificated securities held with JASDEC.  Law Concerning Deposit and Transfer of 
Stock Certificates and Similar Certificates, Law No. 30 of 1984 [hereinafter Securi-
ties Depository Act] art. 27(2) (providing that book entries on the books of 
JASDEC or on the books of JASDEC participants are adequate to effect deliveries 
of certificates). 
156 Id. 
157  Id. at 9. 
158  Id. at 8–9; see  MINPŌ  [Civil Code] arts. 183, 184 (detailing the law on con-
structive transfers and transfers of possession). 
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erwise.159  However, with investment securities being traded in 
enormous volumes even as early as the 1960s in Japan, it was rec-
ognized that a requirement of an actual delivery would be very in-
convenient, even unrealistic. The practice emerged for securities 
firms to keep possession of certificated securities for their custom-
ers; the firms did not deliver the certificates to their customers but 
instead declared themselves as agents for acquiring possessory 
rights for their customers.160  
 The securities firms holding possession of certificated securi-
ties for their customers kept records of holdings and transfers of 
securities credited to customers’ accounts while the certificated se-
curities themselves were deposited and never moved.161  In the 
book-entry system, a core issue is the effect of book entries. The Se-
curities Depository Act162 provided that an account holder was 
deemed to have “possession of certificated securities” credited by 
book entry to an account holder’s account, thus equating a book 
entry with certificated securities.163  Accordingly, a credit to an ac-
count was deemed to be an “actual delivery” of certificated securi-
ties.164  The basic legal concepts and framework for certificated se-
curities, such as protection for innocent acquirers, were thereby 
incorporated into the new system for the protection of custom-
ers.165  Moreover, Article 26 of the Securities Depository Act pro-
vided that “a customer [an account holder] should make an appli-
cation to transfer the securities in his/her account to others.”166 
To be sure, revising the BETA to incorporate the CA-SA ap-
proach would modify the current structure of the BETA for securi-
ty interests, including jō to tanpo transfers, and other outright trans-
159  See Companies Act art. 131(1) (“A possessor of share certificates shall be 
presumed to the the lawful owner of the rights in relation to the shares represent-
ing such share certificates.”).  
160 ICHIRO KAWAMOTO, YŪ KASHŌ KEN FURIKAE SEIDO NO KENKYŪ  259–260 
(1969). 
161  Id. at 9–10. 
162  BETA, Supp. art. 2 (1984); The Securities Depository Act was repealed 
and replaced by the BETA.   
163 Securities Depository Act art.27(1). 
164 Securities Depository Act art.27(2). 
165  Ichiro Kawamoto, Kabuken Hokan Furikae Hō , in 4 SHINPAN CHŪ SHAKU
KAISHA HŌ   319 (Katsuro Ueyanagi, Tsuneo Otori & Akio Takeuchi eds., 1986). 
166  Securities Depository Act art. 26; see ICHIRO KAWAMOTO, supra note 160, at 
312 (stating that the art. 26 of the Securities Depository Act was analyzed as a 
formal requirement of a transfer of possession by Minpō  Article 184 within the 
book-entry system under the Securities Depository Act).  
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fers—it would permit an effective security interest or other transfer 
of an interest in the absence of a book-entry in favor of the trans-
feree.  But the foregoing discussion demonstrates that such a move 
would not represent a radical change from the perspectives of de-
livery of possession (or its equivalent), property law, or function.  
A delivery or its equivalent with respect to movables, claims, or se-
curities is effective under the Minpō  and the BETA through com-
munications or records—orders or declarations (movables), notices 
or acknowledgments and instruments (claims), and book entries 
(securities).  In each case the needs of parties are taken into account 
and the relevant transactional settings are accommodated.  Adopt-
ing the CA-SA approach for securities would be an incremental ad-
justment that the BETA easily could accommodate—a transfer 
made effective by a communication and record, i.e. a control 
agreement.  In our view, adoption of such a revision of the BETA 
should be based on a policy analysis, discussed below in Part 5.2., 
and Japanese property law concepts do not provide any bases for 
rejecting the CA-SA approach. 
 While we are not analyzing here the suggestion to recognize 
nominee holding under Japanese law, it is at least worth noting 
that recognition of nominee holding also would be entirely con-
sistent with the structure and concepts underlying the BETA.  An 
intermediary would credit the account of a single account holder to 
which its duties would be owed and which would be entitled to in-
struct the intermediary.  The BETA regime and the relevant inter-
mediary would not be required in any manner to take account of 
the fact that the account holder might be holding for an unidenti-
fied beneficial owner.  The principal effects of recognizing nominee 
holding would be the effectiveness of the beneficial owner’s rights 
and interest vis-à-vis creditors and the insolvency representative of 
the nominee holder.167 
Finally, the CA approach easily could be applied to make effec-
tive (perfect) security interests, including outright transfers for se-
curity (jō to tanpo), and other outright transfers, such as sales and 
resales pursuant to repo transactions.  In this connection, we 
acknowledge that there may be a certain awkwardness in recogniz-
ing the effectiveness of an outright transfer while the book-entry 
167  Of course, a nominee should not be permitted to use its status as such to 
function as a de facto intermediary for account holders in order to evade the ap-
plicable regulatory regime.  See supra note 143 (discussing requirements and quali-
fications for acting as an intermediary for securities accounts under the BETA). 
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securities remain credited to the securities account of the transfer-
or.  On reflection, however, this approach is no more awkward 
than recognizing the transfer of possessory rights in movables un-
der the Minpō  even in the absence of any change in actual posses-
sion.168  As between the parties, and as between the parties and 
third parties, the point of the CA approach is to provide a reliable 
basis for determining the securities being transferred and the effec-
tiveness of the transfer as it relates to third parties.  Along those 
lines, the extent and nature of the interest being transferred would 
be a matter of proof in the event of any dispute or in the context of 
enforcement. 
5.2.  Perfection by Control Agreement and Security Interests in 
Securities Accounts 
 Turning first to the BETA’s current approach to pledges, it is 
useful to consider what benefits might be achieved by the require-
ment that an effective pledge be carried out by book entries that 
cause particular categories and quantities of securities to be credit-
ed to the securities account of the pledgee—book-entry pledges.  
The most obvious attribute of a book-entry pledge of dematerial-
ized securities is that it is the closest analogue of a traditional pos-
sessory pledge in which physical possession of a pledgor’s security 
certificate is delivered to the pledgee.  As with a physical pledge, a 
book-entry pledge removes the securities entirely from the reach of 
the pledgor (by debit to and removal from its account) and confers 
on the pledgee (by credit to its account) all power and domain over 
the securities.  Functionally and more specifically, the pledgee’s 
power derives from its right to instruct its own intermediary with 
respect to the pledged securities credited to the pledgee’s account 
and the resulting inability of the pledgor to so instruct the pledg-
ee’s intermediary. 
 Substantially the same result that occurs thorough a book-
entry pledge (or through a book-entry jō to tanpo transfer or other 
outright transfer effected by a book entry) could be achieved by the 
use of a control agreement.  Assume that a transferor, the transfer-
or’s intermediary, and the transferee enter into a control agreement 
with respect to an identified quantity of specified issues of securi-
168 See supra note 146 (explaining perfection by control). 
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ties credited to the transferor’s securities account.  Under the con-
trol agreement the pledgor’s intermediary agrees to obey only the 
instructions of the transferee (positive control) and not to obey any 
instructions of the transferor (negative control).  This achieves the 
result that the transferee, but not the transferor, has complete pow-
er over the transferred securities.  This is the same result that 
would occur pursuant to a book-entry transfer, but without the 
need to involve the securities accounts of the transferor and trans-
feree and the transferee’s intermediary.169  From the perspective of 
the transferor’s intermediary, pursuant to the terms of the control 
agreement it knows whose instructions to obey—those of the trans-
feree.  From an operational perspective the impact of such a control 
agreement would be essentially the same as if the transferor had 
instructed its intermediary that employee X is no longer authorized 
go give instructions in connection with the account and that going 
forward employee Y would give instructions.  Adopting a CA fea-
ture would in no manner disrupt the intermediated holding appa-
ratus under the BETA and would preserve the principal benefits of 
book-entry transfers. 
 In the case of a jō to tanpo transaction, in addition to eliminat-
ing the need to involve the transferee’s intermediary in the transac-
tion, a CA perfection feature would provide additional benefits.  In 
particular, because the securities covered by a control agreement 
would not be credited to the transferee’s securities account, but 
would remain in the transferor’s account, the risks and uncertain-
ties in the case of the jō to tanpo transferee’s insolvency proceeding 
would be ameliorated.170 
In one respect the use of a CA perfected transfer could margin-
ally increase transaction costs because it would be necessary for the 
transferee to negotiate with the transferor’s intermediary over the 
terms of the control agreement.  In its simplest form, when the 
agreement would be to confer on the transferee the exclusive right 
to give instructions, these costs might be minimal.  The costs could 
169 Adopting a CA feature would not preclude the use of book-entry pledges. 
For example, a pledgee may wish to have the securities credited to its own ac-
count with its own intermediary inasmuch as it may not be comfortable with the 
pledgor’s intermediary.  While this reflects the wisdom of preserving book-entry 
pledges, it does not provide any support for rejecting the CA approach. 
170 See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text (discussing jō to tanpo 
transferee’s insolvency in the context of jō to tanpo book-entry transfers).  Howev-
er, the advantage that a CA feature could offer in this context would not eliminate 
the long-term need to clarify this aspect of the status of jō to tanpo book-entry 
transfers, which would remain much in need of reform. 
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be considerably more if there were extensive supplemental agree-
ments (e.g., maintaining a collateral value cushion, permitting 
transferor to withdraw or trade absent default, etc.171).  On the oth-
er hand, even in connection with a book-entry pledge it would be 
necessary for the pledgor and pledgee inter se to negotiate (and 
presumably reduce to writing) any such supplemental agreements. 
Even greater benefits could be achieved were CA perfection to 
be complemented by providing for the non-book-entry security in-
terests, including jō to tanpo transfers, and non- jō to tanpo outright 
transfers to cover a debtor’s or other transferor’s entire securities 
account (i.e., all securities from time to time credited to the ac-
count, the CA-SA approach) as opposed to discrete quantities of 
specified issues of securities.  Consider the following example. 
EXAMPLE 4.  At Time 1 (T-1) Pledgor pledged to Pledgee, 
by way of book-entry pledge under the BETA, 100 shares of 
A Company common stock and ¥ 1 Million face amount of 
B Company bonds.  The combined market value of the 
stock and bonds was ¥ 2 Million.  These securities were 
transferred and credited to Pledgee’s pledge account at 
JASDEC and Pledgee is Pledgor’s intermediary  (this is the 
same transactional structure as in Example 2).  The securi-
ties secure a loan with an outstanding principal balance of ¥ 
1,500,000.  Under the applicable loan agreement, Pledgor is 
required to maintain at all times for the benefit of Pledgee 
effectively pledged securities of a market value not less 
than 125% of the outstanding principal balance of the loan 
(the “borrowing base”).  Failure to maintain this collateral 
cushion is a default.  The value of the A Co. shares declined 
precipitously as a result of the disclosure of unfavorable fi-
nancial information.  At T-2 the combined market value of 
the collateral was ¥ 1,300,000, far below the required mini-
mum value of  ¥ 1,875,000 (125% of ¥ 1,500,000).  Although 
there are securities of ample value credited to Pledgor’s se-
curities account maintained with Pledgee, as intermediary, 
only the A Co. and B Co. securities are credited to Pledgee’s 
pledge account at JASDEC. At T-2 Pledgor fails to transfer 
additional securities to Pledgor’s pledge account notwith-
standing Pledgee’s demand on that date.  Before Pledgee 
171 See supra Part 3. (discussing such supplemental agreements). 
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could seek judicial assistance, Pledgor withdrew the re-
maining securities (i.e., those that have not been transferred 
to Pledgee’s pledge account) from its securities account 
with Pledgee. 
Pledgee might have insisted, as an original condition of the 
loan, that all of the securities credited to Pledgor’s securities ac-
count be transferred to Pledgee’s pledge account (an admittedly 
unlikely situation).  Had Pledgor agreed to that term, the value of 
the securities credited to Pledgee’s pledge account then would 
have far exceeded the agreed borrowing base.  Moreover, that ap-
proach might have imposed administrative and record-keeping 
burdens for Pledgor’s trading activities with securities in excess of 
borrowing base. 
EXAMPLE 5.  Now vary Example 4 by assuming that 
Pledgee is not Pledgor’s intermediary but instead is a third-
party lender  (this is the same transactional structure as in 
Example 1).  Assume further that Pledgor (unlikely as it 
might seem) acceded to Pledgee’s (unlikely) demand that 
all of the securities credited to Pledgor’s account with its in-
termediary be transferred to Pledgee’s pledge account with 
JASDEC.  That scenario would be quite cumbersome for 
Pledgor to engage in trading or other dispositions with re-
spect to excess securities—necessitating transfers from 
Pledgee’s JASDEC pledge account to Pledgor’s account 
with its intermediary in advance of Pledgor’s subsequent 
trades or other onward transfers. 
 A central insight here with respect to a security interest in or 
other transfer of an interest in a securities account is the same as 
that for CA perfection—a book entry would not be a necessary step 
for an effective security interest or other transfer.  A further insight 
for a security interest or other transfer of a securities account is that 
the security interest or other transfer need not be on a security is-
sue-by-security issue basis.  It would be sufficient that the account 
holder agrees that the transferee will acquire its interest in all secu-
rities from time to time credited to the securities account and that 
the security interest or other transfer will be so effective as long as 
such securities remain credited to the account.  The CA-SA ap-
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proach combines these insights and would allow a transferee to 
acquire an interest in securities at any time credited to a securities 
account and to perfect the interest pursuant to a single control 
agreement among the account holder-transferor, the transferee, 
and the relevant intermediary.172  We can think of no sound policy 
reason why an account holder should be prohibited from establish-
ing such an arrangement in favor of a transferee.  (Of course, one 
must keep in mind that a holder of a security interest would not be 
entitled to recover more than the secured obligation owed to it.)  It 
follows that there is no justification for an intermediated securities 
legal regime to require pointless and unnecessary steps—i.e., dis-
crete book entries for each issue and quantity of securities in-
volved—to create such an effective pledge or other transfer. 
 Revising the BETA to embrace the CA-SA approach would 
have met the needs of both Pledgor and Pledgee in Examples 4 and 
5. Unlike under a book-entry pledge arrangement contemplated in
those examples, the debtor-transferor would have been free to
trade and withdraw securities from time to time so long as the bor-
rowing base value had been maintained.  The debtor would not
have been inconvenienced (or worse) by the cumbersome require-
ment that excess securities be moved out of the Pledgee’s account
(had that been the arrangement) and back into Pledgor’s account.
The creditor-transferee would not have suffered the diminution of
its borrowing base as a result of the cumbersome requirement of a
book-entry pledge (moving securities into its pledge account), the
debtor’s failure to cooperate, and the debtor’s withdrawal of its ex-
cess securities.
 Adoption of the CA-SA approach for the BETA would be in 
the mainstream of modern secured transactions laws that embrace 
the “floating lien” concept.  This approach is particularly important 
for collateral that turns over, such as inventory and receivables, 
and is a cornerstone of UCC Article 9,173 the UNCITRAL Legisla-
172  Of course, as discussed above a control agreement would not be neces-
sary when the transferor’s intermediary is the transferee.  See supra note 19. It 
would only be necessary for the parties to agree on the circumstances, if any, un-
der which the transferor would have a continued right to instruct the intermedi-
ary-transferee in connection with trading or withdrawals. 
173  U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (“a security 
agreement may create or provide for a security interest in after-acquired collat-
eral”).  Comment 2 to UCC section 9-204 provides, in pertinent part: 
This section adopts the principle of a “continuing general lien” or “floating lien.”  
It validates a security interest in the debtor’s existing and (upon acquisition) fu-
ture assets, even though the debtor has liberty to use or dispose of collateral with-
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tive Guide,174 and the draft UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured 
Transactions.175  If this approach to secured financing of receivables 
and inventory makes sense, and we believe it does, then it should 
make just as much sense for security interests and other transfers 
of interests in book-entry securities.  It is not surprising, then, that 
the CA-SA approach also has been adopted by the Geneva Securi-
ties Convention as an alternative available to a Contracting State 
by declaration176 as well as by UCC Articles 8 and 9.177  Finally, it is 
worth noting that the SA approach reflects a more important, fun-
damental aspect of a modern secured transactions law than does 
the CA approach.  It embodies the core concept of a floating lien 
over after-acquired property.  It is the SA approach in particular 
that would be likely to reduce transaction costs and increase the 
certainty and flexibility in secured transactions.178  But adopting 
the SA approach (whether as a part of a generally applicable se-
cured transactions law, as revisions to the BETA, or otherwise) 
necessarily would require the adoption of a perfection method oth-
er than a book entry—such as the CA approach, filing or registra-
tion in a public registry, or even automatic perfection without any 
further steps. 
 To reiterate and for the same reasons discussed above in 
connection with the CA approach,179 the SA approach easily could 
be extended beyond security interests and applied to outright title 
transfers.  The GSC has embraced the SA approach for all transfers 
not involving a credit to a securities account.180 
out being required to account for proceeds or substitute new collateral. U.C.C. § 9-
204(a) cmt. 2. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).  
174  UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, supra note 4, Rec-
ommendations 13, 17 (explaining that the law should provide that a security right 
may encumber future assets). 
175  UNCITRAL Draft Model Law on Secured Transactions, supra note 5, art. 
6(2) (“A security agreement may provide for the creation of a security right in a 
future asset, but the security right in that asset is created only at the time when the 
grantor acquires rights in it or the power to encumber it.”). 
176 See supra Part 2.2.2. 
177 See supra Part 2.2.1. 
178 See Mooney, Rocks & Schwartz, supra note 51, 49 Bus. L. at 1902 (“By facil-
itating the use of security entitlements and securities accounts as collateral for 
lenders other than the debtor’s securities intermediary, Revised Article 8 and the 
proposed revisions to Article 9 promise to enhance financing prospects and lower 
costs of financing in both the retail and wholesale markets.”). 
179 See supra Part 3. 
180 GSC arts. 12(1), (4)(a) (providing that the SA approach applies to a trans-
fer of any interest in intermediated securities under Article 12 and is not limited to 
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 The foregoing discussion suggests that adoption of the CA-
SA approach in Japan could provide useful flexibility.  For exam-
ple, it would address the situations reflected in Examples 4 and 5.  
It also would accommodate short-term transactions, such as over-
night repo transactions, without the need for book entries and the 
involvement of a transferee’s intermediary.  The CA-SA approach 
would, moreover, facilitate the development of otherwise unavail-
able transactional patterns and financing arrangements.  As ex-
plained in Part 4, the approach has proved to be feasible and useful 
in the United States and has received significant international 
blessing from its incorporation into the GSC.  Of course, adoption 
of the CA-SA approach in Japan would not ensure that it would be 
widely utilized.  But we see no reason to continue to exclude a po-
tentially useful financing tool from the Japanese legal toolbox.  Al-
so as discussed in Part 6, in our view it is quite plausible that the 
approach would find favor with participants in the Japanese mar-
kets. 
5.3.   Implications for Priority Rules and Priority Contests 
Because the BETA book-entry pledge or jō to tanpo book-entry 
transfer contemplates a single credit to a single pledgee or trans-
feree (either to its pledge section or to its proprietary section for 
jō to tanpo), it leaves no room for priority contests.181  Were Japan to 
adopt the CA approach or the CA-SA approach, however, it would 
be possible to create effective but conflicting interests in the same 
intermediated securities.  It follows that such adoption would 
make it necessary also to adopt appropriate priority rules.182  Hap-
                                                                                                                             
security interests).  Curiously, perhaps, the SA approach is applicable under UCC 
Article 9 but does not expressly apply to transfers of interests other than security 
interests.  See supra Part 2.2.1.  However, we are not aware of any reason why the 
adoption of the SA approach should be ineffective in the case of such outright 
transfers if so agreed by the parties to a transfer. 
181 See Mooney & Kanda, Core Issues, supra note 9, at 114 (providing an over-
view of the operation and functions of the BETA). 
182 The possibility of a junior security interest is sometimes thought to be 
beneficial.  In the circumstance where the value of the collateral exceeds the 
amount secured by a senior security interest, the availability of a junior security 
interest frees up additional collateral to secure credit extended to the debtor, to 
the end that both obligations could be satisfied from the same collateral.  Under 
current Japanese law, a similar result could be achieved by pledging certain secu-
rities to one pledgee and different securities to another pledgee.  In any event and 
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pily, because both the UCC and the GSC offer similar, although not 
identical, sets of priority rules, Japan need not reinvent the wheel 
in order to adapt these rules (or a variation) for the CA (or CA-SA) 
approach under the BETA. 
The occurrence of second-priority security interests may not be 
commercially significant in the context of movables generally or 
securities in particular.  However, by accommodating the creation 
of junior security interests that are generally effective against third 
parties, the CA approach would offer additional flexibility and 
could make feasible some transactions that otherwise would not 
take place under current law.183 
Under the baseline priority rule that we advance here, conflict-
ing security interests that become effective against third parties 
pursuant to control agreements generally would rank in priority 
according to the time that the security interests become effective 
against third parties.184  However, as to after acquired securities 
covered by a control agreement, the time that the control agree-
ment is entered into should be the relevant time for priority pur-
poses.185  While this baseline rule would accommodate reaching 
the appropriate results in practice, in some cases it would not op-
erate strictly as a “priority” rule.  This is because the CA-SA ap-
                                                                                                                             
regardless of the utiltiy of providing for junior security interests, the CA-SA ap-
proach would necessitate the adoption of such priority rules. 
183  On the possible benefits of junior security interests, see supra note 178. 
184 See U.C.C. § 9-328(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (stating 
that conflicting security interests perfected by control generally rank in priority in 
time of obtaining control); GSC art. 19(3) (providing that interests generally rank 
according to time of becoming effective against third parties).  Note that the UCC 
priority rule necessarily embraces complications that would be unnecessary under 
our proposal for the BETA.  That is in part because a security interest perfected by 
control has priority over a security interest perfected by another method.  U.C.C. § 
9-328(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).  A security interest in a secu-
rity entitlement (including a securities account) may be perfected by filing a fi-
nancing statement in the appropriate public registry.  U.C.C. § 9-312(a) (AM. LAW 
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (discussing perfection of security interest in in-
vestment property by filing.)  Also, an additional complication arises because it is
possible to obtain control of certificated and uncertificated securities in addition to
control of security entitlements.  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 8-106(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2000) (control of certificated security in beaer form), (b) (control of
certificated security in registered form), (c) (control of uncertificated security).
185 If the GSC version of the definition of control agreement were adopted, 
however, the time that the intermediary receives notice of the control agreement 
would apply if the intermediary were not a party to the agreement.  See GSC arts. 
1(k) (defining “control agreement,” quoted in part supra note 82); 19(3) (detailing 
the priority ranking of “interests that become effective against third parties under 
Article 12”). 
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proach would apply not only to security interests, including jō to 
tanpo transfers, but also to outright title transfers of full ownership 
interests in book-entry securities.  If a first-in-time control agree-
ment were to make effective such an outright transfer, a later trans-
fer (of any kind) to which a later-in-time control agreement were 
applicable would not be a “second priority” or “junior” interest be-
cause the second-in-time transferee would have received no inter-
est whatsoever—the account holder would have had no remaining 
interest to transfer.186 
Our proposal contemplates only two methods for a pledge or 
other transfer to be made effective against third parties (i.e., meth-
ods of perfection)—by a book-entry, either a pledge or another 
book-entry transfer, as under the current BETA, or through a con-
trol agreement.187  In our view the method of perfection—book-
entry or control agreement—should not bear on the question of 
general effectiveness as against third parties.  Instead, the perfec-
tion regime should encourage parties to select the perfection meth-
od that is most efficient for their circumstances and the nature and 
terms of their transaction. 
Notwithstanding this general preference for neutrality as be-
tween methods of third-party effectiveness, perfection by book en-
try necessarily would provide an advantage over perfection by 
control agreement.  The temporal (first in time) priority rules for 
perfection by control agreement mentioned above should apply 
only with respect to competing interests in the same securities ac-
count.  For example, assume that an account holder’s securities ac-
186  The discussion in the text assumes that the described result would derive 
from either non-BETA law or would need to be provided in the BETA itself.  The 
discussion also assumes that the priority rule would treat all security interests, 
including and jō to tanpo transfers, as equivalents.  But one could imagine that a 
jō to tanpo transfer might be treated as an outright transfer of full ownership for 
these purposes. The result described in the text is explained in the Official Com-
mentary to the GSC, inasmuch as Article 12 of the GSC also applies to any type of 
transfer of an interest in intermediated securities.  OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra 
note 113, at 124–25 (Example 19-12). 
187 As explained above, however, the proposal also is entirely compatible 
with a regime for perfection by compliance with a public notice regime such as 
filing or registration with a public official or registry.  See supra note 145 and ac-
companying text.  However, that alternative would require an additional priority 
rule.  Consistent with the approach taken in the UCC, a transfer perfected by 
compliance with such a public notice regime should be subordinate to a transfer 
perfected by a control agreement.  See U.C.C. § 9-328(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2000) (providing that a secuity interest perfected by control has pri-
ority over security interest perfected by another method). 
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count is debited by its intermediary, but wrongly so because the 
account was subject to a control agreement in favor of a creditor 
holding a security interest.  Assume further that (directly or indi-
rectly) corresponding with that debit another pledgee’s pledge sec-
tion (or a transferee’s proprietary section in the case of a jō to tanpo 
transfer) is credited.  In that case the interest of the second-in-time 
pledgee or transferee should have priority over (or should cut off) 
the interest of the first-in-time transferee pledgee if the second 
pledgee or transferee satisfies an appropriate test of good faith or 
innocence.188  It would be necessary to add such a test to the BETA 
to accommodate situations such as the example just posited.189 
Both the UCC and the GSC incorporate another exception to 
the temporal priority rule for perfection by control agreement. 
Each provides a special priority rule when the interest in interme-
diated securities in acquired by the account holder’s own interme-
diary.190  Under the UCC, “a security interest held by a securities 
intermediary in a security entitlement or a securities account main-
tained with the securities intermediary has priority over a conflict-
ing security interest held by another secured party.”191  The GSC 
takes a contrary approach:  If an intermediary has an interest that 
is effective against third parties and thereafter effects a designating 
entry or enters into a control agreement for the benefit of another 
person, the other person’s interest has priority over the interest of 
188  See U.C.C. § 8-502 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994) (providing 
that a person acquiring security entitilement for value and without notice of an 
adverse claim is not liable for action based on the adverse claim); GSC art. 18(1) 
(providing that unless acquirer of interest in securities or intermediated securities 
knows or has reason to know of another person’s interest and that acquisition vio-
lates rights of the other person, (i) acquirer’s interest is not subject to other per-
son’s interest, (ii) acquirer is not liable to other person, and (iii) interest of acquirer 
is not invalid or reversible). 
189 It is possible that under the BETA as currently in effect, such conflicts 
could occur, for example, between an account holder whose account was wrong-
fully debited and an onward transferee of book-entry securities.  In an appropri-
ate case, an onward transferee could cut off the interest of such an account holder.  
Under the BETA, an innocent account holder will acquire complete ownership of 
securities, i.e., free of competing property claims, if it receives a credit in good 
faith and without gross negligence.  See BETA arts. 77 (corporate debt securities), 
102 (JGBs), 144 (corporate equity securities); Mooney & Kanda, Core Issues, supra 
note 9, at 103 (providing an explanation for the operation and functions of the 
BETA).  However, that issue and other issues that such a conflict would raise are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
190  This is the transactional pattern involved in Example 2, supra Part 4., and 
Example 3, supra Part 5.3 
191  U.C.C. § 9-328(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
820 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
the intermediary.192 
In practice these two facially contrary priority rules often 
would lead to similar results.  A prospective creditor, whether an 
intermediary or a third party, that would otherwise be subordinat-
ed under the applicable priority rule can choose to condition its ex-
tension of credit upon the conflicting (or potentially conflicting) 
party’s agreement to subordinate its interest.  In the absence of 
such a subordination agreement the new credit would not be ex-
tended and no priority contest would ensue.  For example, under 
the UCC approach, a prospective third party lender could insist 
that the intermediary subordinate its existing (or any future) inter-
est to the new lender’s interest.  Similarly, under the GSC ap-
proach, an intermediary could insist on a prospective third party 
lender’s subordination as a condition to making a designating en-
try or entering into a control agreement.  On the plausible assump-
tion that market participants that would be affected by these priori-
ty rules are financial institutions and other professionals, we doubt 
that they would give rise to any surprises once the rules were put 
in place. 
We are agnostic as to which approach—UCC or GSC—to in-
termediary priority should be taken by Japan in adopting the CA-
SA approach.  Consequently, we would favor the approach that 
would face the weakest political opposition and the strongest polit-
ical support, to the end that the reforms proposed here would be 
more likely to be adopted.193 
192  This priority rule applies “unless that other person and the intermediary 
expressly agree otherwise”.  GSC art. 19(4). 
193  Anecdotally, and based on Mooney’s involvement with drafting the rele-
vant provisions of both the UCC and the GSC (see notes 12, 51, supra), the ap-
proach suggested in the text also influenced the substance of those instruments.  
The UCC drafters were quite sensitive to the potential opposition of the securities 
industry to the concept of perfection by control.  Obviously, subordinating the in-
terests of intermediaries to later-in-time third party interests would not have ap-
pealed to those advancing the interests of securities intermediaries.  In similar 
fashion, the pervasive attitudes in the room during the GSC negotiations tended 
to favor the protection of innocent third parties over intermediaries, especially 
when a third party would have no way to discover an intermediary’s pre-existing 
interest. 
2017] BOOK ENTRY SECURITIES IN JAPAN 821 
5.4.   Right of Retention under Japanese Civil Code (Minpō ) and 
Commercial Code (Shō hō ) 
Certain provisions of the Minpō  and the Shō hō  suggest a pos-
sible alternative to the proposed CA-SA approach for addressing 
the Pledgee’s situation in Example 4.  These provisions provide a 
creditor with a “right of retention” under certain circumstances.194  
One possible problem with the application of either right of reten-
tion would be the apparent conflict between such a right and an in-
termediary’s obligation to comply with its account holder’s instruc-
tions under the BETA.195  Under Minpō  Article 295(1) if a possessor 
of a “thing” (movable) owned by another person has a claim that 
has fallen due with respect to the thing, the possessor may retain 
possession of the thing until the claim is satisfied.196  In the United 
States vernacular, the possessor has the equivalent of a statutory 
lien on the thing possessed securing the possessor’s claim.  How-
ever, Article 295(1) in its current form would be inadequate for ad-
dressing Pledgee’s situation in Example 4.  First, Pledgee’s claim 
for repayment of the loan is not a “claim . . . with respect to” the 
securities that were not pledged to Pledgee.  The relevant “claim” 
(Pledgor’s obligation to repay the loan from Pledgee to Pledgor) 
appears to be wholly unrelated to those securities.   
Shō hō  Article 521 provides a somewhat similar but broader 
right of retention that applies to a claim of a merchant against an-
other merchant arising out of a commercial transaction, but only if 
194  MINPŌ  Art. 295 (“Content of Rights of Retention”); SHŌ HŌ  [Commercial 
Code] art. 521 (“Right of Retention of Merchants”). 
195  See BETA arts. 66 (corporate debt securities), 88 (JGBs), 128 (corporate eq-
uity securities) (account holder’s right to be reflected by record of a credit); 70 
(corporate debt securities), 95 (JGBs), 132 (corporate equity securities) (upon ac-
count holder’s instruction the intermediary “must” enter debits and credits  ac-
count).  An intermediary might seek a benefit analogous to a right of retention by 
obtaining its account holder’s agreement that after the account holder’s default in 
its obligations to the intermediary the intermediary would be relieved of its obli-
gation to comply with the account holder’s instructions. Arguably such an agree-
ment would be unenforceable as being against public policy or as controvening 
the intermediary’s duties under the BETA. Similarly, adopting the CA approach 
would require a clear and specific amendment of the BETA given the existing 
statutory obligation of an intermediary to follow its account holder’s instructions. 
196 MINPŌ  [Civil Code] Art. 295(1) (“If a possessor of a Thing belonging to 
another person has a claim that has arisen with respect to that Thing, he/she may 
retain that thing until that claim is satisfied; provided, however, that this shall not 
apply if such claim has not yet fallen due.”). 
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the claim is due.197  Under Article 521, the claimant may retain an 
“object or negotiable instrument of value . . . until the claim is satis-
fied.”198  Article 521 applies only if the obligor on the claim owns 
the object or instrument and the claimant has possession pursuant 
a commercial transaction.199  As with Minpō  Article 295, Article 
521 might not provide adequate protection for Pledgee in the con-
text of Example 4.  It is controversial whether book-entry securities 
can be recognized as an “object or negotiable instrument of value” 
within the meaning of Shō hō  Article 521. There are cases regard-
ing paper promissory notes in which the courts have approved a 
right of retention claimed by banks while the banks possessed the 
notes for discount or collection and the owner had entered insol-
vency proceedings.200  Citing these cases, some have strongly ar-
gued that a party, such as an account holder’s intermediary, should 
not lose the right simply because securities are dematerialized. At 
the same time, others question whether book-entry securities can 
be “possessed,” and if they can be possessed, then by whom.201  
Because only account holders have ownership of book-entry secu-
rities under the BETA, arguably the account holders, not the inter-
mediaries, would “possess” them.202  In that case an intermediary 
197  Article 521 provides: 
When any claim between merchants arising from an act that constitutes a com-
mercial transaction for both parties is due, the obligee may retain any object or 
negotiable instruments of value owned by the obligor of which the obligee has 
taken possession by way of the commercial transaction with the obligor, until the 
claim is satisfied; provided, however, that this shall not apply where the parties 
manifest their intention otherwise. 
SHŌ HŌ  Art. 521 (emphasis added).  A more faithful English translation of the Jap-
anese would substitute the word “any” for the italicised “the” in the quoted text.  
The commercial transaction in connection with which the ogligee has taken pos-
session need not be the same commercial transaction from which the claim arose. 
198  Id. 
199  Id. 
200  Saikō  Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jul. 14, 1998, Hei 7 (o) no.264, 52  SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ  [MINSHŪ ] 1261 (Japan) (possession for discount, de-
cided under HASAN HŌ ); Saikō  Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 15, 2011, Hei 22 (ju 受) 
no. 16, 65 SAIKŌ  SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ  [MINSHŪ ] 3511 (Japan) (possession 
for collection, decided under Civil Rehabilitation Act). 
201 Shigeyuki Maeda, Shasaikabusikitō furikaehō  niokeru Yū kashō ken no 
Pēpāresuka to Shō jiryū chiken no Seihi, in 22 KINYŪ HŌ MU KENKYŪ KAI HŌ KOKUSHO,
YŪ KASHŌ KEN NO PĒPĀ RESUKATŌ  NI TOMONAU TANPOKENNADO KINYŪ TORIHIKI
NIKAKARU HŌ TEKIMONDAI 1, 4–11 (2013).  However, for purposes of the right of re-
tention we see no policy justification for differing treatment for paper promissory 
notes (or certificated securities) and book-entry securities. 
202 Hiroki Morita, Yū kashō ken no Pēpāresuka no Riron, 25 Kinyūkenkyū , 
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would not possess the securities for purposes of Shō hō  Article 521. 
Furthermore, the loan in Example 4 may or may not be a commer-
cial transaction (depending on its purpose)203 and Pledgor and 
Pledgee may or may not be merchants within the meaning of Arti-
cle 521.204 
Assuming that these rights of retention (in their current forms) 
would not apply in the context of Example 4, if the right of reten-
tion were thought to be the appropriate approach the provisions 
(or one of them) could be modified so as to apply explicitly in the 
context of book-entry securities under the BETA.205  However, in 
our view the CA-SA approach for transactions governed by the 
BETA is the better approach.206  First, a right of retention that 
Nov. 2006, at 1, 39–40. 
203  For example, the loan could have been made to Pledgor, a natural person, 
for personal, family or household purposes. 
204 For example, credit unions (Shinyō kinko, Shinyō kyō dō kumiai) are non-
profit corporations that provide financial support for Japanese citizens, and there-
fore the Supreme Court decided that a credit union is not a “merchant” within the 
meaning of the Shō hō , even though their businesses have expanded and are now 
quite similar to that of banks in general.  Saikō  Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 5, 1973, 
Sho 46 (o) no.781, 726 HANREI JIHŌ  92 (Japan); Saikō  Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 18, 
1988, Sho 59 (o) no. 557, 42, SAIKŌ  SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ  [MINSHŪ ] 575 (Ja-
pan).  
205 See Denshitekikiroku ni motozuku kenri wo meguru hō ritsumondai 
kenkyūkai, supra note 138, at 57–58 (suggesting such an approach with respect to 
Shō hō  Article 521). 
206 The Financial Law Board in Japan has suggested: 
Where it may not be so clear that interpreted intermediated securities 
could be as “object of negotiable instrument of value” under SHŌ HŌ  Ar-
ticle 521, and there is concern to apply the right of retention widely, es-
pecially in a bankruptcy procedure, we should be amending SHŌ HŌ  to 
include intermediated securities under Article 521 clearly. Or another op-
tion would be introducing “control agreement” method into the BETA 
following with the GSC and the UCC.  
Financial Law Board, Furikaekabushikitō  to Shō jiryū chiken no Seihi nitsuite, 
KINYŪ HŌ MUJIJŌ , No.2052, 38, at 44 – 45, note 20 (2016).  The Board has expressed 
further concerns as well: 
Where a Japanese intermediary holds domestic intermediated securities 
(issued in Japan) and foreign intermediated securities (issued outside Ja-
pan) for its customers, the different governing laws might be applied for 
those securities according to international private law for intermediated 
securities in Japan. Since the legal effect of retention of right may vary in 
jurisdictions and might cause unexpectedly different results, it could be 
appropriate to provide widely accepted method of “control agreement”, 
agreed by parties, for secured transactions in the BETA. 
Id. 
The Financial Law Board is a committee of Japanese attorneys and scholars who 
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would confer on a securities intermediary in all cases a statutory 
lien on all securities credited to an account holder’s account to se-
cure all obligations of the account holder to the intermediary 
would be too broad.  While the parties might opt out of the right of 
retention by agreement,207 we suspect that in the vast majority of 
situations this would not occur because account holders typically 
would not initiate negotiations to opt out of the right of retention.  
The CA-SA approach, however, would respect party autonomy by 
leaving the securities to be covered by a transfer (either the securi-
ties account or only discrete securities) to the agreement of the par-
ties and without shifting the burden to the account holder to nego-
tiate for an opt out, or narrowing, of the right of retention.  Stated 
otherwise, we doubt that a default rule providing such a broad 
right of retention would reflect the bargain that parties would typi-
cally strike were the matter to be negotiated. 
Second, an expanded and targeted right of retention as con-
templated above would not address the situation of the third-party 
lender in the context of Example 5.  Moreover, such a broad right 
of retention would reduce the transaction costs for the securities 
intermediary as a lender when compared to a third party transfer-
ee under a CA-SA regime.  This could result in an uneven playing 
field and a less competitive credit market for account holders as 
prospective borrowers. 
One might infer from the carefully restricted scope of the rights 
of retention under current law that a broad right with respect to 
any property in the possession of a claimant in respect of any obli-
gation of the owner of the property has not found favor with policy 
makers in the legislative process.  Were the rights of retention to be 
expanded to cover the account holder-securities intermediary situ-
                                                                                                                             
specialize in financial law, and the Bank of Japan serves as its Secretariat. “The 
Board aims to propose recommendations on specific legal issues, in respect of un-
certainties that may cause practical difficulties in introducing new financial prod-
ucts and transactions.” Financial Law Board, About Us (available at: 
http://www.flb.gr.jp/epage/eabout.htm). For more information on the Board, 
see, http://www.flb.gr.jp/epage/ehome.htm. 
207 Note that Shō hō  Art. 521, quoted note 193, provides that it “shall not ap-
ply where the parties manifest their intention otherwise.”  This clearly contem-
plates the possibility of a contractual waiver of a right of retention arising under 
the Shō hō .  On the other hand, the Minpō  does not provide an explicit opt out 
provision.  However, a creditor (such as a holder of a right of retention) may agree 
to a moratorium on payment by its debtor, thus delaying the accrual of a right of 
retention.  Consequently, it is understood that a party can effectively waive the 
right of retention under the Minpō  by means of such a moratorium.  See 
DŌ GAUCHI, supra note 136, at 15–16. 
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ation, it seems likely that adjustments would be required to ac-
commodate the specific context of book-entry securities in the 
BETA system.  Given this, while we do not take a strong position, 
it might be preferable to adopt the CA-SA approach within the 
BETA rather than making adjustments to provisions of more gen-
eral application in the Minpō  and the Shō hō .  In sum, while an 
expansion of the right of retention to embrace explicitly book-entry 
securities might be appropriate, that move would not provide an 
adequate substitute for the more flexible CA-SA approach and the 
party autonomy that the CA-SA approach embraces. 
Finally, while we prefer the CA-SA approach as a modification 
of the BETA pledge rules, we note that the SA approach draws 
some policy support from the rights of retention just discussed.  In 
each case the preferential rights are conferred on a claimant with 
respect to all of the relevant property in the claimant’s possession 
(in the case of the rights of retention) or control (in the case of the 
SA approach). 
6. TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT IN JAPAN:  ARE THE PROPOSED
REVISIONS A GOOD FIT, A WASTEFUL DIVERSION, OR A PRUDENT
RISK? 
 This Part first considers the question of whether and to what 
extent commercial law rules should, and do, reflect and support 
existing commercial practices or, instead, channel and influence 
commercial practices.  Most probably would agree that the issue 
posed is not an “either-or” matter and that properly understood 
commercial law rules both reflect and channel commercial practic-
es.  At the outset we note our priors in the context of the proposed 
CA-SA approach for the BETA:  Because security interests in and 
other transfers (such as in repos) of book-entry securities represent 
important commercial transactions in Japan, adjustments in the 
rules governing such transfers that provide more flexibility and 
lower transactions costs are presumptively beneficial and, absent 
unusual circumstances, should be adopted.  On the other hand, if 
there are strong indications that, for some reason, such adjustments 
would not be accepted and used in fact, then such “reforms” might 
not be worth the effort.  (No one enjoys hosting a party to which no 
one else shows up.) 
Consider first an example drawn from UCC Article 9.  Until 
826 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
the promulgation and subsequent enactment of Revised Article 
9,208 with very limited exceptions209 perfection of a security interest 
in an “instrument”210 could be accomplished “only by the secured 
party’s taking possession.”211  The official comments to Section 9-
304 of the 1978 Official Text of the UCC explained: 
With respect to instruments subsection (1) provides that . . . 
taking possession is the only available method [of perfec-
tion] . . . The rule is based on the thought that where the 
collateral consists of instruments, it is universal practice for 
the secured party to take possession of them in pledge; any 
surrender of possession to the debtor is for a short time; 
therefore it would be unwise to provide the alternative of 
perfection for a long period by filing which, since it in no 
way corresponds with commercial practice, would serve no 
useful purpose.212 
The comment suggests that the rule permitting perfection only 
by possession emanates from “universal practice.”  But, of course 
that would be universal practice inasmuch as taking possession 
was the only means of achieving long-term perfection!  It seems 
clear enough that in the security interest context practice followed 
the statute, not the other way around.  Revised Article 9 now per-
mits perfection of a security interest in instruments by filing a fi-
nancing statement.213  Once again, practice follows the statute.214 
208 See note 51 and accompanying text. 
209  U.C.C., 1978 Official Text (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1978), Id. 
at § 9-304(4), (5) (temporary perfection for 21 days in limited circumstances); Id. at 
9-306(2), (3) (continuation of security interest and continuation of perfection in
proceeds).
210  Id. at § 9-105(1)(i) (defining “[i]nstument” as “a negotiable instrument . . . 
or any other writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and is not 
itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of 
business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment”). 
211  Id. at § 9-304(1)) ; see also Id. at § 9-305 (perfection by possession). 
212 Id. at § 9-304 cmt. 1. 
213 Id. § 9-312(a). 
214 As the official comment to UCC section 9-312 explains: 
Under subsection (a), a security interest in instruments may be perfected by filing. 
This rule represents an important change from former Article 9, under which the 
secured party’s taking possession of an instrument was the only method of 
achieving long-term perfection. The rule is likely to be particularly useful in 
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 There is some evidence as well from Japan that reforms in 
secured transactions law will influence commercial practices and 
that market participants will adjust their behavior to take account 
of such changes in the legal framework.  Consider, for example, the 
PRAMC.215  The PRAMC was introduced to address the issue of a 
lack of public notice in the case of outright transfers of movables 
for security (jō to tanpo) transactions.216  (As explained in Part V.A., 
however, any objection to the CA approach based on the absence 
of public notice would not be persuasive.)  One study found that 
banking practices adjusted to the PRAMC in that a substantial 
number of filings for transfers of title had been made with the To-
kyo Registration Office.217  Moreover, following the effectiveness of 
the PRAMC firms specialized in asset-based financing commenced 
doing business in Japan.218  In addition, bank regulators have rec-
ognized “movables as appropriate security as long as the secured 
assets are adequately managed and reasonably evaluated.”219  
While these adjustments may not be striking, they suggest that it is 
quite plausible that financing practices would adjust to the adop-
tion of the CA-SA approach under revisions to the BETA. 
 We do not suggest that these examples necessarily demon-
strate that the CA-SA approach would be widely accepted and 
employed in practice were Japan to adopt the proposed revisions 
to the BETA.  Ultimately, policymakers should weigh the costs and 
benefits of adopting the CA-SA approach for the BETA and the 
likelihood that it would find favor in the market.  However, we 
transactions involving a large number of notes that a debtor uses as collateral but 
continues to collect from the makers. 
Id. at § 9-312 cmt. 2.  Note that even when perfection by filing is available for in-
struments, a secured party may wish to take possession of an instrument in order 
to prevent a good faith purchaser from cutting off or subordinating the secured 
party’s interest.  See Id. at § 3-306 (holder in due course of negotiable instrument 
take free of conflicting claims); 9-330(d) (good faith purchaser for value which 
takes possession of instrument without knowledge of violation of rights of anoth-
er secured party having security interest perfected other than by possession has 
priority over other secured party’s security interest). 
215 PRAMC, supra note 27.  
216 Kozuka & Fujisawa, Old Ideas, supra note 117 at 299. 
217 Id. at 301–02, 308–09. 
218 Id. at 309. 
219 Id. (“This policy change is in accordance with the Basel Accord II,” citing 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, Comprehensive 
Version, Bank for Int’l Settlements paras. 289, 509–24 (June 2006), http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2A7-K9XZ]. 
828 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
submit that any evaluation of the benefits of the CA-SA approach 
in the BETA environment should not be limited to a consideration 
of only existing transactional contexts in which the approach might 
be applied or to the specific transactions that presently might be 
envisioned.  In this connection, decades of experience in the United 
States financial markets should be considered.  The CA approach 
has provided a useful and flexible tool for the creation of interests 
in securities that are effective against third parties without the ne-
cessity of book entries.  The CA approach has provided this flexi-
bility by building on predecessor transactional patterns, such as tri-
party repo transactions, in contexts as varied as secured commer-
cial loans and secured loans to individual investors.  The flexibility 
of the CA approach has permitted parties to allow for a wide range 
of options with respect to nature and extent of access and power 
over securities by an account holder and transferees.  The SA ap-
proach also has accommodated flexibility and efficiency through 
the “floating lien” attributes of security interests in any securities 
that from time to time may be credited to a securities account.  And 
under the CA-SA approach, such interests may be made effective 
by a single control agreement.  In our view it is quite plausible that 
the CA-SA approach would be embraced by and found to be quite 
useful in the Japanese financial markets. 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 Following the Introduction we explained the operation of a 
control agreement method of perfection and the concept of security 
interests in securities accounts.  The discussion drew on the devel-
opment of these concepts in the drafting history of UCC Articles 8 
and 9 and the GSC.  After outlining our proposal for incorporating 
these features into Japanese law, we examined pledges of securities 
under the BETA and the revisions that would be necessary to in-
corporate the CA-SA approach.  We next offered our policy anal-
yses of the CA-SA approach.  We explained how the CA method of 
perfection would be conceptually consistent with traditional Japa-
nese property law, including deliveries of movables under the 
Minpō  without an actual change of possession, assignments of 
nominative claims under the Minpō , and transfers by book entries 
under the BETA. 
We conclude that adopting the CA-SA approach under the 
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BETA would offer transactional flexibility.  In particular, the CA 
approach could address risks of undersecurity as reflected by Ex-
amples 4 and 5 and could accommodate short term transactions 
without the need for book entries and involvement of a transferee’s 
intermediary.  Moreover, the CA approach would facilitate the 
“floating lien” feature contemplated the SA approach for security 
interests and other interests in securities accounts as securities 
move in and out of an account.  We suggest that it is plausible that 
the CA-SA approach would facilitate the emergence of new, more 
flexible transactional patterns in the Japanese markets.  Finally, our 
discussion of the CA-SA approach also provides a platform for a 
further, and future, consideration of a more comprehensive mod-
ernization of Japanese secured transactions law. 
